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THE FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT: 
UNBRIDLED ENFORCEMENT AND 
FLAWED CULPABILITY STANDARDS 
DETER SMES FROM ENTERING THE 
GLOBAL MARKETPLACE 
Stephen S. Laudone* 
 
In the wake of the Watergate Scandal, which exposed a variety of 
corporate as well as political abuses, the Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC) discovered that a staggering number of large 
corporations had made questionable or illegal payments exceeding $300 
million to foreign government officials, politicians, and political parties.  In 
1977, Congress passed the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) to curb 
the negative impact of these corrupt payments on United States foreign 
policy objectives regarding the promotion of democracy and the free 
market system. 
In the decades since the passage of the FCPA, the government has 
expanded the use of the statute beyond its original target (large 
corporations) to small- and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), which often 
lack the resources and international business sophistication to guard 
against bribery and extortion in all its forms and thus avoid liability. 
Additionally, the government’s enforcement regime exists largely outside 
the courts. As a result, the investigative tactics and settlement agreements 
are overly harsh on SMEs, exceed statutorily proscribed penalties, and 
discourage utilization and litigation of a variety of statutory provisions 
designed to protect businesses from liability. 
This Comment argues that the FCPA should be amended to provide 
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editors of the Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology for all of their efforts in revising 
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SMEs proper defenses against liability through the mental state provisions 
for domestic concerns and require more judicial oversight of the 
Department of Justice (DOJ) and the SEC enforcement policies. These 
changes will encourage SMEs to enter the international marketplace and 
protect SMEs from investigative costs and settlement penalties that do 
serious harm to their financial situation and are often disproportionate to 
the alleged wrongdoing. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The management of a hypothetical Alabama-based agriculture 
irrigation utility company (AIC) receives a request from a regional 
government entity in an African country (Country Z) looking to increase 
farming production through enhanced irrigation systems to address its food 
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shortage and import-export imbalance.1  AIC has never engaged in an 
international project but sees this as an incredible opportunity to grow its 
business, currently consisting of 140 employees and grossing $15 million a 
year in revenue.2  AIC representatives work with a regional official from 
Country Z over the terms of the contract which include a provision for an 
initial down payment of 35% of the estimated project costs and the 
remaining 65% at the conclusion of the work.  AIC agrees to employ local 
workers to the extent possible and will send American employees to 
evaluate the region’s needs, manage the project, and provide the requisite 
expertise throughout.  Towards the end of negotiations, the official 
introduces the AIC representatives to a local consultant who is “familiar 
with the agricultural production and irrigation needs of the region” and will 
“represent the government throughout the process and assist in dealing with 
local entities.”  AIC representatives agree to these terms and begin work on 
the project to assist with upland storage of rainfall runoff, develop well and 
surface/groundwater processes, and promote effective water management, 
all of which was to be completed in eight months.3 
Six months into the project, Country Z’s immigration officials inform 
AIC that several of their American employees in the country lack the 
requisite documentation and are facing fines, jail, or deportation unless AIC 
pays cash fines to rectify the situation.  Too far into the project to back out 
and concerned for their safety, AIC encourages the targeted employees to 
 
1  This hypothetical is designed to present the reader with a simple picture of some of the 
difficult issues that confront small- and medium-sized enterprises conducting business 
overseas for the first time.  
2  Small- and medium-sized enterprises employ between 100 and 5,000 employees and 
revenue varies by industry.  See Summary of Size Standards by Industry Sector, U.S. SMALL 
BUS. ASS’N,  (current as of Feb. 26, 2016), https://www.sba.gov/content/summary-size-
standards-industry-sector (last visited Nov. 22, 2015) (providing data regarding what 
constitutes a small business); Small and Medium-Sized Enterprises: Overview of 
Participation in U.S. Exports, Inv. No. 332-508 (USITC PUB. 4125, January 2010), U.S. 
INT’L TRADE COMM’N,  https://usitc.gov/publications/332/pub4125.pdf (“[N]o universally 
accepted definition of an SME [exists], even within the U.S. government” because “the 
relative nature of the ‘small’ and ‘medium’ size classifications . . . can apply differently to 
firms in the manufacturing, agricultural, and service sectors.”).  Part III.B.2 of this article 
contains a more thorough discussion of what constitutes an SME.  The FCPA itself does not 
contain a definition for SME.   
3  The inspiration for this hypothetical was partially drawn from the following sources: 
Irrigation, Alabama Agricultural Irrigation Information Network, ALA. COOP. EXTENSION 
SYS., http://www.aces.edu/anr/irrigation/ (last visited Mar. 25, 2016) and Sandra Postel, 
Small-scale Irrigation Boosts Incomes and Food Security in sub-Saharan Africa, NAT’L 
GEOGRAPHIC (Aug. 8, 2013), http://voices.nationalgeographic.com/2013/08/08/small-scale-
irrigation-boosts-incomes-and-food-security-in-sub-saharan-africa/. 
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pay the fines and reimburses them through their next paycheck.4  At the 
conclusion of the eight-month project period, AIC requests payment from 
Country Z officials for the remaining balance under the contract.  Months 
go by and finally AIC gets a response from a Country Z official requiring 
AIC to pay a “service fee” to a government official in order to obtain the 
remaining balance on the contract and close the account.  Based on its 
financial position and the need for these proceeds for continued investment 
in future projects, AIC representatives agree to pay the fees to facilitate 
final payment for services rendered.5 
After completion of the project, the U.S. government opens an 
investigation as either the result of a tip or regularly scheduled audit of 
companies doing business in regions of the world considered particularly 
prone to corruption.  During this investigation, the government requests 
information regarding the work done by the local consultant and an 
itemization justifying the fees said consultant charged.  When AIC is unable 
to sufficiently assuage the U.S. government’s concerns based on Country 
Z’s propensity for corruption, further investigation reveals the local 
consultant was the relative of a government official and sent a portion of the 
fees to said official as a kickback.  Suddenly, AIC faces civil penalties for 
violating the accounting provisions of the FCPA and criminal charges for 
the alleged briberies made to the foreign government in the form of 
consultant fees and the “service fees.”  The company is at risk of fines and 
disgorgement potentially in the millions, and any directors, officers, 
 
4  This situation is based on the facts of the Securities and Exchange Commission’s 
(hereinafter “SEC”) investigation of Test Automation & Controls, Inc.  See Joseph W. 
Yockey, Solicitation, Extortion, and the FCPA, 87 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 781, 796–97 (2011) 
(citing Client Memorandum from Wilkie Farr & Gallagher LLP on SEC Brings FCPA 
Charges Based on Extorted Payments (Jan. 20, 2010), http://www.willkie.com (search 
“NATCO FCPA”)).   
5  This portion of the hypothetical is based on the facts of the Department of Justice’s 
(hereinafter “DOJ”) investigation of Vitusa Corporation and related individual defendants. 
See Beverley Earle & Anita Cava, When Is A Bribe Not A Bribe? A Re-Examination of the 
FCPA in Light of Business Reality, 23 IND. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 111, 133 (2013) (referring 
to United States v. Vitusa Corporation, Case No. 94-CR-253, 3 FCPA Rep. 699.155 (D. N.J. 
1994) and Exhibit B: Stipulated Facts and Application of the United States Sentencing 
Guidelines, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, (May 23, 1994), https://www.justice.gov/criminal-
fraud/case/united-states-v-vitusa-corporation-court-docket-number-94-cr-253).  Situations 
like this one enter the gray area of what constitutes a facilitating payment (to cause a foreign 
official to do a lawful action in the event of a delay or a need for expedited action) which is 
legal under the FCPA versus a bribe. To many SMEs, this fee might seem unjust, but 
without experienced counsel and a compliance program, company leadership may not realize 
it could be perceived as a bribe to a foreign official.  
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employees, or agents found to be culpable face prison time as well.6 
This hypothetical situation encompasses several common pitfalls that 
small- and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) face as they enter the global 
marketplace.7  Companies that are unable to hire sophisticated legal 
representation for the purpose of developing a thorough compliance 
program due to insufficient financial means, or a lack of knowledge of the 
extraordinary risks associated with international business, are left at the 
mercy of a vigorous and strict governmental enforcement regime.  When 
carrying out the FCPA enforcement regime, the government often ignores, 
or chooses not to view as mitigating, the fact that companies regularly face 
extortion from foreign governments, companies, and individuals.8 The 
government also often ignores the size and sophistication of the company 
when investigating and making prosecutorial determinations even when it is 
clear the entity and its leadership lacked intent to violate the FCPA and 
engage in bribery or foreign corruption.9 
After almost forty years and several congressional amendments, the 
existing case law on the FCPA, coupled with a sharp increase in DOJ and 
SEC enforcement measures, have resulted in two trends, both of which 
operate to the detriment of SMEs.  The first trend is a narrowing of vital 
statutorily-created exceptions and affirmative defenses to FCPA liability, 
and the second trend is a broadening of the mental states required for 
conviction under the statute.  Looking forward, Congress should amend the 
statute to require a mental state equivalent to specific intent, and account for 
differences between sophisticated, multi-national corporations and SMEs.  
The “willfulness” requirement should also apply to SMEs as it does to 
 
6  See infra Part III.B.1, notes 146–147 for a brief discussion of individual penalties both 
monetary and imprisonment. 
7  For the definition of SMEs, see infra Part III.B.2.  
8  Yockey, supra note 4, at 797 (noting that in the TEST case, the SEC charged the 
company with FCPA accounting violations even after acknowledging that the company 
“falsely recorded the employees’ reimbursement for the ransom payments as a salary 
advance” because they were the victims of extortion).  
9  U.S. DEP’T OF JUST. & U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, A RESOURCE GUIDE TO THE U.S. 
FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT 8 (2012) [hereinafter RESOURCE GUIDE] (admitting that 
there are areas where “the United States’ anti-bribery efforts could be improved, including 
consolidating publicly available information on the application of the FCPA and enhancing 
awareness among small- and medium-sized companies about the prevention and detection of 
foreign bribery”).  The government also formally acknowledges that “[i]n addition to the 
existence and scope of a company’s training program, a company should develop 
appropriate measures, depending on the size and sophistication of the particular company, to 
provide guidance and advice on complying with the company’s ethics and compliance 
program, including when such advice is needed urgently.”  Id. at 59. 
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individuals.10  Additionally, Congress should act to reinvigorate the 
“greasing the wheels” (hereinafter “facilitating payments”) and “local law 
or customs” exceptions while also establishing mandatory Article III 
jurisdiction over proposed settlements by requiring the filing of civil and 
criminal complaints. 
Part I of this Comment provides a history of the FCPA and a 
discussion of the functional effect of the statute and a prima facie case 
under the anti-bribery provisions. Part II outlines some of the problems that 
have developed around what little FCPA case law exists and provides 
examples of how many small- and medium-sized enterprises find 
themselves in situations of potential liability under the current system 
without a clear understanding of the government’s burden regarding mental 
states and the statutory exceptions that should be available to them.  Part III 
describes these problems in more detail by discussing the enforcement 
regime that the DOJ and SEC have developed outside of the court system 
and the problems with insufficient litigation surrounding the FCPA.  
Finally, Part IV discusses both existing proposed solutions to some of the 
problems outlined in Parts II and III as well as some new solutions 
specifically designed to aid small- and medium-sized enterprises as they 
navigate the global marketplace while also trying to avoid crippling liability 
under the FCPA. 
I. THE FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT 
A. HISTORY: THE ORIGINAL PROBLEM AND CONGRESSIONAL ACTION 
Bribery has been a crime for millennia and punishable under the 
common law for centuries.  The first British statute criminalizing bribery 
was passed in the 1300s and the first references to bribery cases in Britain 
appear in the Star Chamber records around 1550.11  The United States 
expanded the term “bribery” well beyond its common law meaning to 
include all government officials, as well as commercial bribery of 
 
10  In both the domestic concern and individual anti-bribery provisions of the FCPA, the 
“willfully” requirement only applies to natural persons acting on behalf of themselves or a 
company, not to the company itself.  15 U.S.C. § 78dd-2(g)(2) (2012) (subjecting “[a]ny 
natural person . . . acting on behalf of such domestic concern, who willfully violates” the 
statute to criminal and civil fines); Id. at § 78dd-3(e)(2) (subjecting “[a]ny natural person 
who willfully violates” the statute to criminal and civil fines).  
11  See James Lindgren, The Theory, History, and Practice of the Bribery-Extortion 
Distinction, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 1695, 1696 n.6, 1705 (1992–1993) (citing JOHN T. NOONAN, 
JR., BRIBES (1984) (“providing a history of bribery-type offenses from 3000 B.C. to 1984”)).  
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individuals acting in a private capacity.12  The United States continued this 
expansion by becoming the first nation to criminalize international bribery 
through the passage of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act in 1977.13 
In the wake of the Watergate Scandal, which exposed a variety of 
corporate (foreign bribery) as well as political abuses (slush funds for 
domestic politicians), the SEC conducted its own investigation, which 
culminated in an extensive “Report on Questionable and Illegal Corporate 
Payments and Practices” (SEC report).14  The SEC report detailed the 
widespread misuse of corporate funds and questionable or illegal corporate 
payments which “represented a serious breach in the operation of the 
Commission’s system of corporate disclosure and, correspondingly, in 
public confidence in the integrity of the system of capital formation.”15  
Specifically, over 400 corporations had admitted making questionable or 
illegal payments exceeding “$300 million in corporate funds to foreign 
government officials, politicians, and political parties.”16  According to the 
 
12  Perrin v. United States, 444 U.S. 37, 43–45 (1979). 
13  Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-213, 91 Stat. 1494 (codified as 
amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(b), (d)(1), (g)-(h), 78dd-1 to -3, 78ff (2006)), amended by 15 
U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1 to -3, 78ff (1988) and 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1 to -3, 78ff (1998).  
14  H. Lowell Brown, Parent-Subsidiary Liability Under the Foreign Corrupt Practices 
Act, 50 BAYLOR L. REV. 1, 2–4, nn.5–6 (1998) (discussing how the SEC acted after 
“disclosures by the Watergate Special Prosecutor of overseas ‘slush’ used by U.S. 
corporations to make illegal campaign contributions in the U.S. and corrupt payments to 
foreign officials”); see also S. REP. NO. 95-114 at 3–4 (1977), reprinted in 1977 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 4098, 4101 (referring to SEC Report on Questionable and Illegal Corporate 
Practices).  The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act was later passed to combat the first of these 
abuses, bribery of foreign officials to gain business advantages. See also Disclosure of 
Payments to Foreign Government Officials Under the Securities Acts, 89 Harv. L. Rev. 
1848, 1849 n.11 (1976) (defining slush funds as “sums of money not reflected in the 
corporate accounts” which in some cases were found to have been “used for secret payments 
to foreign government officials”). 
15  See S. REP. NO. 95-114, supra note 14, at 3–4 (referring to SEC Report on 
Questionable and Illegal Corporate Practices); see also Mike Koehler, The Story of the 
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 73 OHIO ST. L.J. 929, 932–49 (2012) (detailing the 
investigations of the Church Committee and SEC report and the major examples of corrupt 
payments made to heads of state and U.S. politicians leading up to the passage of the FCPA). 
16  H.R. REP. NO. 95-640, at 4 (1977), https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/
criminal-fraud/legacy/2010/04/11/houseprt-95-640.pdf [hereinafter HOUSE REPORT] (stating 
that over 117 of them rank in the top Fortune 500 industries). 
  While the House Report does not explicitly define what questionable or improper 
payments are, the phrase seems to be used to describe foreign bribes which are not expressly 
illegal compared to “domestic bribes [which] are clearly illegal” under U.S. law. Id. at 6. 
This understanding is supported by the fact that the proposed law sought to reach “foreign 
subsidiaries of any U.S. corporation” because of the extensive use of these foreign 
subsidiaries “as a conduit for questionable or improper foreign payments authorized by their 
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House Report created by Congressman Harley O. Staggers Sr., Chairman of 
the Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, companies were 
engaging in everything from bribing high-ranking foreign officials for 
favorable action on behalf of the company, to making facilitating payments 
to encourage government agents to discharge certain ministerial or clerical 
functions.17  The volume of these domestic and foreign corrupt payments 
posed a danger to the integrity of the United States’ elections and foreign 
policy goals, including the goals of promoting democracy and a free market 
system where companies should be able to honestly and ethically compete 
in areas like price and quality of product.18  Thus, the FCPA contained anti-
bribery provisions, as well as accounting requirements to prevent 
companies from hiding bribes in financial records.19  The law provides for 
joint enforcement responsibilities, shared between the DOJ and the SEC for 
the criminal and civil applications.20 
Since its passage, the FCPA has been amended twice.  The 1988 
Amendments21 were designed to address corporations’ concerns regarding 
unclear and excessive accounting standards and the costs of competing in 
 
domestic parent.” Id. at 12.  
  Similarly, the SEC does not provide a clear definition of what constitutes questionable 
foreign payments, but notes in their report that virtually all questionable payments involved 
“the deliberate falsification of corporate books or records, or the maintenance of inaccurate 
or inadequate books and records which, among other things, prevented these practices from 
coming to the attention of the company’s auditors, outside directors and shareholders.” 
Report on Questionable and Illegal Corporate Payments and Practices, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. 
COMM’N 13 (May 1976), https://www.sec.gov/spotlight/fcpa/sec-report-questionable-illegal-
corporate-payments-practices-1976.pdf. 
17  HOUSE REPORT, supra note 16, at 4.  
18  Id. at 4–5 (listing the negative ramifications flowing from this level of bribery). The 
report notes: 
For example, in 1976, the Lockheed scandal shook the Government of Japan to its political 
foundation and gave opponents of close ties between the United States and Japan an effective 
weapon with which to drive a wedge between the two nations. In another instance, Prince 
Bernhardt of the Netherlands was forced to resign from his official position as a result of an 
inquiry into allegations that he received $1 million in pay-offs from Lockheed.  
Id. at 5.  
19  15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1 to -3 (2012) (anti-bribery provisions). See generally Mary Jane 
Dundas & Barbara Crutchfield George, Historical Analysis of the Accounting Standards of 
the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 10 MEM. ST. U. L. REV. 499 (1980) (conducting an in-
depth historical analysis of the FCPA accounting standards).  
20  Brown, supra note 14, at 16 (1998) (discussing the shared, yet distinct enforcement 
authority of the DOJ and SEC under the FCPA) (citing 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1 (1994) for SEC’s 
authority and 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-2(d) for DOJ’s authority). 
21  Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Amendments of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-418, 102 Stat. 
1107, 1415 (codified as 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1 to -3, 78ff). 
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foreign markets.22  In the decade following the 1988 Amendments, 
enforcement efforts focused on policing international agreements with little 
extraterritorial enforcement.23  Then, in 1998, a new set of Amendments24 
was prompted by the Organization for Economic Cooperation & 
Development Convention on combating the bribery of foreign officials.25  
At the time, Congress agreed with the business community that the FCPA 
was negatively impacting U.S. business success abroad because there were 
no restraints on foreign firms that would pay bribes without fear of penalty, 
to the detriment of U.S. businesses.26  The 1998 Amendments expanded the 
jurisdiction of the FCPA to foreign persons who commit an act furthering a 
foreign bribe while on U.S. soil, as well as U.S. businesses and nationals 
acting wholly outside the United States.27  The Amendments also expanded 
the FCPA’s scope to include payments made to secure “any improper 
advantage” and broadened the definition of “public official” to include 
officials of public international organizations.28  The FCPA has remained 
unaltered since the 1998 Amendments, though the DOJ and SEC 
enforcement models have changed.29  The following subsection addresses 
the core anti-bribery provisions applicable to companies and individuals. 
 
22  H.R. REP. NO. 100-576, at 6 (1981), https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/
criminal-fraud/legacy/2010/04/11/tradeact-100-418.pdf; Impact of Foreign Corrupt Practice 
Act on U.S. Business: Comptroller’s General Report to the Congress of the United States, 
U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE 6 (1981), http://www.gao.gov/assets/140/132199.pdf. 
23  Emily Willborn, Extraterritorial Enforcement and Prosecutorial Discretion in the 
FCPA: A Call for International Prosecutorial Factors, 22 MINN. J. INT’L L. 422, 426 (2013). 
24  International Anti-Bribery and Fair Competition Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-366, 
112 Stat. 3302 (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1 to -3, 78ff (1998)). 
25  Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Officials in International Business 
Transactions and Related Documents, ORG. FOR ECON. COOPERATION & DEV. (Nov. 21, 
1997), http://www.oecd.org/daf/anti-bribery/ConvCombatBribery_ENG.pdf [hereinafter 
OECD Convention]. 
26  See S. REP. NO. 105-277, at 1–2 (1998) (explaining that bribery is estimated to affect 
overseas procurements valued in the billions of dollars each year and how the amendment 
reconciles the FCPA with the OECD Convention in order to “level the playing field”) 
[hereinafter BANKING COMMITTEE SENATE REPORT 1998].  
27  Id. at 4 (“The new offense . . . provid[es] for criminal jurisdiction in this country over 
bribery by foreign nationals of foreign officials when the foreign national takes some act in 
furtherance of the bribery within the territory of the United States.”).  
28  See id. at 2. 
29  Matthew J. Kovacich, Backyard Business Going Global: The Consequences of 
Increased Enforcement of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (“FCPA”) on Minnesota and 
Wisconsin, 32 HAMLINE L. REV. 529, 544–49 (2009) (discussing how the DOJ and SEC are 
“engaging in new, creative techniques to sanction individual company agents, disgorge 
companies of their profits, and settle investigations through deferred prosecution 
agreements” compared to the FCPA’s first thirty years of existence). 
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B. THE PROHIBITIONS AND ELEMENTS OF A PRIMA FACIE CASE 
In order to establish a prima facie criminal case against an entity or 
individual under the FCPA’s anti-bribery provisions, the government must 
establish the existence of six elements.  The defendant must be: 
1. a domestic concern [or individual or issuer] 
2. that made use of a means or instrumentality of interstate commerce 
3. corruptly 
4. in furtherance of an offer or payment of anything of value to any person 
5. while knowing that the money would be offered or given directly or indirectly to 
any foreign official 
6. for purposes of influencing any act or decision of such foreign official in his official 
capacity.30 
The FCPA’s anti-bribery provisions encompass three mental states that 
address acts done “corruptly,” acts done while “knowing” bribery will 
result, and acts done “willfully” by individuals to violate the statute.31  
Additionally, Congress has carved out several exceptions to the anti-bribery 
provisions including the “facilitating payments” exception, which states that 
prohibitions do not apply to any “facilitating or expediting payment to a 
foreign official, political party, or party official, the purpose of which is to 
expedite or to secure the performance of a routine governmental action by a 
foreign official, political party, or party official.”32  The Senate Report of 
the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, favorably 
reporting bill S. 305 and recommending it for passage, noted that the 
facilitating payments exception would cover “payments for expediting 
shipments through customs or placing a transatlantic telephone call, 
securing required permits, or obtaining adequate police protection, 
transactions which may involve even the proper performance of duties.”33 
The statute’s anti-bribery provisions provide for two affirmative 
defenses as well.  The first is the “legality defense,” which permits a 
payment, gift, offer, or promise that is lawful under the laws or regulations 
 
30  Stichting Ter Behartiging Van de Belangen Van Oudaandeelhouders In Het Kapitaal 
Van Saybolt Int’l B.V. v. Schreiber, 327 F.3d 173, 179–80 (2d Cir. 2003) [hereinafter 
Stichting]; see also Thomas McSorley, Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 48 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 
749, 757–58 (2011) (setting forth the seven elements of an FCPA violation) (citing 15 U.S.C. 
§§ 78dd-1, 78dd-2, 78dd-3).  
31  See infra Part II.A for a fuller discussion of the meaning of these mental state terms 
and how courts have interpreted them.  
32  15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1(b) (2012) (for issuers); § 78dd-2(b) (for domestic concerns); § 
78dd-3(b) (for “any person”).  
33  S. REP. No. 95-114 at 10 (1977), reprinted in 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4098, 4108 
[hereinafter BANKING COMMITTEE SENATE REPORT 1977]. 
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of the foreign official’s country.34  While many nations permit behavior that 
would fall under the legality defense, companies can rarely take advantage 
of this defense because the written laws of foreign nations rarely allow for 
such conduct because it is implicit in the business and political culture.35  
The second is the “reasonable expenditure defense,” which permits a 
payment, gift, offer, or promise if it was a “reasonable and bona fide 
expenditure, such as travel and lodging expenses” that the company 
incurred on behalf of a foreign official and was directly related to the 
“promotion, demonstration, or explanation of products or services” or “the 
execution or performance of a contract with a foreign government or 
agency thereof.”36 
When requested, the DOJ provides guidance to companies through 
opinion procedure releases on what is considered reasonable and bona fide 
expenditures.  The trend throughout these opinion releases is that the 
expenditures tend to be modest, related to travel and hotel reimbursement, 
and paid to the providers, not to the officials themselves.37  For example, 
one anonymous requestor received an opinion procedure release sanctioning 
the payment of domestic expenses for “approximately six junior to mid-
level officials of a foreign government for an educational program at the 
[r]equestor’s U.S. headquarters” after these officials attend “an annual six-
week long internship program for foreign insurance regulators sponsored by 
the National Association of Insurance Commissioners.”38  The expenses to 
be paid were limited to “domestic economy class air travel . . . domestic 
lodging, local transport, meals and incidental expenses (up to a modest set 
amount per day upon presentation of a receipt), and a modest four-hour city 
sightseeing tour for the six officials.”39  While these exceptions and 
 
34  15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1(c)(1) (2012) (for issuers); § 78dd-2(c)(1) (for domestic concerns); 
§ 78dd-3(c)(1) (for “any person”). 
35  Kovacich, supra note 29, at 536 & n.38 (referencing DOJ, Lay-Person’s Guide to 
FCPA, http://www.justice.gov/criminal-fraud/fcpa-guidance (last visited Nov. 13, 2015) 
[hereinafter Lay-Person’s Guide to FCPA]); RESOURCE GUIDE, supra note 9, at 23 (“[T]he 
fact that bribes may not be prosecuted under local law is insufficient to establish the defense. 
In practice, the local law defense arises infrequently, as the written laws and regulations of 
countries rarely, if ever, permit corrupt payments.”). 
36  15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1(c)(2) (2012) (for issuers); § 78dd-2(c)(2) (for domestic concerns); 
§ 78dd-3(c)(2) (for “any person”). 
37  F. JOSEPH WARIN ET AL., THE U.S. FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT: ENFORCEMENT 
AND COMPLIANCE 18 (Bloomberg BNA, 2014).  
38  FCPA Opinion Procedure Release No. 07-02 (Dep’t of Justice Sept. 11, 2007).  
39  Id.; see also FCPA Opinion Procedure Release No. 04-04 (Dep’t of Justice Sept. 3, 
2004) (sanctioning a “Study Tour” for foreign officials to help “develop a practical 
understanding of how mutual insurance committees are managed and regulated” and 
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defenses to FCPA liability and enforcement are statutorily prescribed, their 
applicability has been severely narrowed by the DOJ and SEC.  The 
following section discusses problems surrounding the various mental states 
required by the FCPA. 
II. PROBLEMS CREATED BY THE FCPA STATUTE AND CURRENT 
ENFORCEMENT PRACTICES WITH REGARD TO THE MENTAL STATE 
REQUIREMENT 
The FCPA anti-bribery provisions contain several layers of mental 
state requirements including acts done “corruptly,” acts done while 
“knowing” bribery will result, and acts done “willfully” by individuals to 
violate the statute, but these terms and how they interact are not clearly 
defined in the context of the statute.  This has led to some confusion in the 
circuit courts,40 a problem that is exacerbated by the lack of cases being 
tried under the FCPA.41  Some guidance does come from the FCPA’s 
legislative history. 
The FCPA prohibits domestic concerns and any individuals on their 
behalf from acting “corruptly” in furtherance of a payment, gift, or offer of 
anything of value to influence or induce a foreign official, political 
campaign, or candidate for office to violate the law, act in his official 
capacity, or aid in securing an improper advantage for the company.42  The 
 
differences (if any) in the organization, daily operation, capitalization, regulations, 
demutualization, and management of mutual insurance companies versus stock insurance 
companies (life and non-life)”); FCPA Opinion Procedure Release No. 07-01 (Dep’t of 
Justice July 24, 2007) (sanctioning payment of domestic expenses for a “six-person 
delegation of the government of an Asian country for an educational and promotional tour of 
one of the requestor’s U.S. operations sites”).  
40  See generally Gregory M. Lipper, Foreign Corrupt Practices Act and the Elusive 
Question of Intent, 47 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1463, 1470 (2010) (providing an overview of the 
circuit court’s discussion of the FCPA mental state requirements and efforts by Congress to 
provide clarity). 
41  The lack of FCPA case law is driven by the high stakes companies face when 
confronted with a DOJ or SEC investigation.  Companies are reluctant to risk the resources 
necessary to successfully litigate against the government and pay the penalties if found 
guilty.  See infra Part III.A for a fuller discussion of the government’s enforcement regime 
and its impact on companies’ business and FCPA litigation. 
42  15 U.S.C. § 78dd-2(a)(1)–(2) (2012).   
The term “domestic concern” means—(A) any individual who is a citizen, national, or resident 
of the United States; and (B) any corporation, partnership, association, joint-stock company, 
business trust, unincorporated organization, or sole proprietorship which has its principal place 
of business in the United States, or which is organized under the laws of a State of the United 
States or a territory, possession, or commonwealth of the United States.  
Id. § 78dd-2(h)(1). 
6. LAUDONE 3/1/2017  5:55 PM 
2016] FCPA: UNBRIDLED ENFORCEMENT 367 
statute also prohibits acts done “corruptly” in furtherance of a payment, gift, 
or offer of anything of value to a person, “while knowing that all or a 
portion of such money or thing of value” will be used to influence a foreign 
official.43  The statute does provide a definition section which explains that 
a person’s state of mind constitutes “knowing” when: “(i) such person is 
aware that such person is engaging in such conduct, that such circumstance 
exists, or that such result is substantially certain to occur; or (ii) such person 
has a firm belief that such circumstance exists or that such result is 
substantially certain to occur.”44  Knowledge can be established if the 
individual is aware of a “high probability of the existence of such 
circumstance, unless the person actually believes that such circumstance 
does not exist.”45  According to the 1977 Senate Report’s definition: 
[t]he word “corruptly” is used in order to make clear that the offer, payment, promise, 
or gift, must be intended to induce the recipient to misuse his official position in order 
to wrongfully direct business to the payor or his client, or to obtain preferential 
legislation or a favorable regulation. The word “corruptly” connotes an evil motive or 
purpose, an intent to wrongfully influence the recipient.46 
The House Report defines the term similarly, stating: 
[t]he word “corruptly” is used in order to make clear that the offer, payment, promise, 
or gift, must be intended to induce the recipient to misuse his official position; for 
example, wrongfully to direct business to the payor or his client, to obtain preferential 
legislation or regulations, or to induce a foreign official to fail to perform an official 
function.47 
The term “corruptly” is not defined anywhere in the statute.  In the handful 
of FCPA cases that have reached the circuit courts, the legislative history 
has been influential in understanding the word “corruptly.”48 
When dealing with a person charged as an individual or an officer, 
director, agent, or some other type of company employee, the individual 
 
43  Id. § 78dd-2(a)(3) (2012). 
44  Id. § 78dd-2(h)(3)(A) (2012). 
45  Id. § 78dd-2(h)(3)(B) (2012). 
46  S. REP. NO. 95-114, at 10 (1977), reprinted in 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4098, 4108.  
47  H.R. REP. NO. 95-640, at 7–8 (1977) (comparing the term “corruptly” to its use to 
“connote[] an evil motive or purpose,” as in 18 U.S.C. § 201 which criminalizes the bribing 
of a domestic official).  
48  See, e.g., United States v. Kay, 513 F.3d 432, 443 (5th Cir. 2007) (The court discusses 
how “the [legislative] history serves as additional support for the court’s resolution of the 
ambiguity of the business nexus test.  This Court looked to numerous aspects of the Act—its 
text, its title, its ‘grease payments’ exception, the dictionary definition of ‘business,’ and the 
Act’s legislative history.”); Stichting, 327 F.3d 173, 182 (2d Cir. 2003); United States v. 
Liebo, 923 F.2d 1308, 1312 (8th Cir. 1991).  
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must “willfully” violate the FCPA by corruptly influencing a foreign 
official (directly or through an intermediary), in order to be subject to 
criminal fines or incarceration.49  The Supreme Court has stated that 
“willfulness” generally requires at least “proof that the defendant knew that 
his conduct was unlawful. . .  .”50 
These three mental states present challenges to SMEs who lack the 
sophisticated legal counsel and compliance programs of larger entities, 
especially when SMEs are new to the global marketplace and unfamiliar 
with the risks, customs, and laws of the foreign countries in which they 
operate.  Challenges faced by SMEs, like obtaining the knowledge required 
to understand the FCPA’s mental state requirements, are exacerbated by the 
low volume of case law and the confusing nature of relevant circuit court 
opinions.51   
A. THE COURTS INTERPRET THE MENTAL STATE REQUIREMENTS 
Few courts have examined the FCPA, which is in part due to the lack 
of litigation reaching the trial stage.52 This is a result of the enforcement 
tactics of the DOJ and SEC.53  In United States v. Liebo,54 the Eighth 
Circuit first considered the meaning of “corruptly” using interstate 
commerce to make a payment, promise, or gift to a foreign official for the 
purpose of influencing their actions.  In Liebo, the first consular for the 
Niger Embassy in Washington, D.C. considered airline tickets to be 
personal gifts from defendant Liebo.55  The court was satisfied that 
sufficient evidence existed to allow a reasonable jury to find that the airline 
tickets were given “corruptly” as a “commission payment” or to induce the 
consular to misuse his official position.56  The Eighth Circuit also affirmed 
the district court’s jury instructions, which defined “corruptly” as requiring 
that “the offer, promise to pay, payment or authorization of payment, must 
be intended to induce the recipient to misuse his official position or to 
 
49  15 U.S.C. § 78dd-2(g)(2)(A) (2012); 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-3(e)(2)(A) (2012). Civil 
penalties are also available under 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-2(g)(2)(B) (2012) and 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-
3(e)(2)(B) (2012).  
50  Lipper, supra note 40, at 1470 (quoting Bryan v. United States, 524 U.S. 184, 186 
(1998)). 
51  See infra Part II.B. 
52  See generally Lipper, supra note 40.  
53  See Part III.A for a fuller discussion of the government’s enforcement regime and its 
impact on companies’ business and FCPA litigation.  
54  923 F.2d 1308, 1308 (8th Cir. 1991).  
55  Id. at 1312. 
56  Id.  
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influence someone else to do so,” and that “an act is ‘corruptly’ done if 
done voluntarily [a]nd intentionally, and with a bad purpose of 
accomplishing either an unlawful end or result, or a lawful end or result by 
some unlawful method or means.”57   
This jury instruction contains dueling definitions of the term corruptly.  
The first portion reflects the FCPA’s legislative history that a payment must 
be made with “the specific intent to cause a misuse of an official’s position” 
in order to be done “corruptly.”58  The second portion seems to expand this 
definition by “suggesting that the ‘corruptly’ element is met when the 
‘private payment to the official [is] intended to simply get the fair treatment 
to which the payer was otherwise legally entitled.’”59  Not only does this 
second portion of the jury instruction seem to broaden the applicability of 
the “corruptly” element, it potentially conflicts with both the “facilitating 
payment” exception and the interpretation of legislative history that 
“corporations are protected when foreign officials use economic extortion 
to receive payments.”60  The Eighth Circuit has not clarified the definition 
of the term “corruptly” since Liebo. 
Over a decade passed before another circuit court addressed the mental 
states of the FCPA.  In 2003, the Second Circuit held in Stichting Ter 
Behartiging Van de Belangen Van Oudaandeelhouders In Het Kapitaal Van 
Saybolt Int’l B.V. v. Schreiber (“Stichting”)61 that a defendant is not 
required to have knowledge that it is violating the FCPA in order to be 
convicted because the FCPA is a general intent statute and knowledge of 
the specific statute applies “mainly [to] tax and other technical statutes that 
use the term ‘willfully.’”62  The court was not clear that its analysis was 
only applicable to companies because the term “willfully” does appear in 
the statute as applied to individuals.63  The court also looked to the guidance 
 
57  Id.  
58  Preston Tull Eldridge, Without Bounds: Navigating Corporate Compliance Through 
Enforcement of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 66 ARK. L. REV. 733, 761 (2013).  
59  Id. (quoting Bruce W. Klaw, A New Strategy for Preventing Bribery and Extortion in 
International Business Transactions, 49 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 303, 328 (2012)). 
60  Id. at 761–62.   
61  327 F.3d 173 (2d Cir. 2003).  Later that same year, the Eighth Circuit affirmed jury 
instructions that construed the FCPA knowledge requirement to include “deliberate 
ignorance,” so long as the defendant(s) deny any knowledge of a criminal scheme despite 
being presented with facts that put the defendant(s) on notice of possible criminal activity 
that the defendant(s) then failed to investigate.  United States v. King, 351 F.3d 859, 866–67 
(8th Cir. 2003). 
62  Id. at 181 n.3, 182–83. 
63  Id. at 181–83. 
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of Senate and House Reports for an understanding that “corruptly” should 
be viewed as it is under the bribery statute, meaning, a “bad or wrongful 
purpose and an intent to influence a foreign official to misuse his official 
position.”64  The Second Circuit viewed the Eighth Circuit’s affirmation of 
the jury instructions in Liebo as an approval of the trial court’s reasoning 
that the defendant violated the FCPA only if he sought to induce a foreign 
official to act “unlawfully” by misusing his position.65 
The following year, the individual defendants in United States v. Kay 
(Kay III)66 argued on appeal that a jury must find beyond a reasonable doubt 
that they “corruptly” and “willfully” violated subsections of the FCPA in 
order to obtain a criminal conviction.67  Because the statute does not define 
“willfully,” the court discussed the three common law definitions of 
criminal “willfulness”: (1) the basic definition (committing an act and 
having knowledge of that act); (2) the intermediate definition (committing 
an act with knowledge that the act is unlawful); and (3) the strict definition 
(knowing the terms of the statute and violating them).68  The Fifth Circuit 
held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying the 
individual defendants’ two proposed jury instructions because the first 
proposed instructions were not substantively correct and the second 
proposed instructions were substantially covered by the trial court’s jury 
instructions which sufficiently captured both the basic and intermediate 
definitions of willfulness.69  The court rejected the strict definition of 
willfulness as inapplicable to the FCPA, adopting the Second Circuit’s 
reasoning that the FCPA is a general intent statute.70  Finally, the Fifth 
Circuit stated that the indictment was “not required to contain the exact 
 
64  Id. at 183. 
65  Id. at 183 n.9. 
66  513 F.3d 432 (5th Cir. 2007). 
67  Id. at 446. 
68  Id. at 447–48. 
69  Id. at 447–49. The Fifth Circuit held that: 
[t]he district court, by instructing the jury that a guilty verdict required a finding that defendant 
acted “voluntarily and intentionally, and with a bad purpose or evil motive of accomplishing 
either an unlawful end or result,” and by including a  separate “knowing” instruction, correctly 
indicated that the jury must identify evidence amounting to “knowledge of facts that constitute 
the offense” required by the traditional criminal definition of willfulness (which we have 
described as the first category of willfulness). The court’s instructions also substantially covered 
the requested instruction that Defendants acted “corruptly,” meaning they acted “knowingly and 
dishonestly, with the specific intent to achieve an unlawful result by influencing a foreign public 
official’s action in one’s own favor.”  
Id.  
70  Id. at 448. 
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term ‘willfulness’” and that “an indictment alleging that [a] defendant 
‘corruptly did endeavor’ sufficiently ‘charges an intentional act,’ which is 
‘interchangeable with the term willful.’”71 
Scholar Gregory Lipper argues that there are two issues with the 
decision in Kay III.  First, the Fifth Circuit upheld the district court’s jury 
instructions, which stated the statute’s use of “corruptly” meant “done 
voluntarily and intentionally, and with a bad purpose or evil motive of 
accomplishing either an unlawful end or result” and the statute’s use of 
“knowingly” meant “done voluntarily and intentionally, not because of 
accident or mistake.”72  The district court failed to provide a separate 
instruction regarding the meaning of “willfully” and when the jury asked if 
a “lack of knowledge of the FCPA could be considered an accident or 
mistake,” the court simply “referred the jury to its definition of the term 
knowingly.”73  Second, Lipper points out that the Fifth Circuit conflated 
“willfully” and “corruptly” and held that the “‘[d]efendants’ knowledge that 
they were committing the acts of corrupt bribery of foreign officials was 
sufficient’ to convey the separate requirement of willfulness.’”74  The 
danger in reading the statute to allow corruptly to “subsume[] the concept 
of willfulness [is that it] effectively reads the ‘willfully’ element out of the 
statute.”75  This removes a layer of protection for individuals, like the 
defendants in Kay III, where a statute “extends to a range of conduct that an 
ordinary person would not necessarily understand to be unlawful.”76  Lipper 
believes the Fifth Circuit made this error because of the confusing 
discussion of the willfulness requirement in Stichting as it applies to 
companies.77 
The Second Circuit revisited the mental state issue under the FCPA in 
United States v. Kozeny.78  The defendant argued that the district court 
 
71  Id. at 451 (quoting United States v. Haas, 583 F.2d 216, 220 (5th Cir. 1978)). 
72  Lipper, supra note 40, at 1475 (quoting Kay III, 513 F.3d at 446). 
73  Id. (quoting Kay III, 513 F.3d at 446, 449 n.62). 
74  Id. at 1476 (quoting Kay III, 513 F.3d at 449 n.62) (emphasis in original). 
75  Brief for National Association for Criminal Defense Lawyers as Amici Curiae 
Supporting Respondents, United States v. Kay, 513 F.3d 432 (5th Cir. 2007) (No. 05-20604), 
2006 WL 5582334 at *5. 
76  Id. (comparing the FCPA to a variety of other statutes containing a willfulness 
requirement for individuals including Ratzlaf v. United States, 510 U.S. 135, 140–41 (1994) 
which addresses a tax statute and declares that judges should resist treating statutory terms in 
such a way as to render an element of an offense as surplusage).  See Part IV.B for a 
discussion of Ratzlaf and a solution to the court’s conflation of mental state requirements.  
77  Lipper, supra note 40, at 1475. 
78  667 F.3d 122, 135–36 (2d Cir. 2011). 
6. LAUDONE 3/1/2017  5:55 PM 
372 LAUDONE [Vol. 106 
“erred by failing to instruct the jury that the government needed to prove 
[that he] acted ‘corruptly’ and ‘willfully’ to sustain a conviction on FCPA 
conspiracy.”79  The Second Circuit appeared to agree with the holding of 
the Fifth Circuit, that to violate the FCPA one must act “corruptly” and 
“willfully.”80  The court held that the district court properly instructed the 
jury that it must find the defendant knowingly entered a conspiracy that had 
the object of “corruptly” and “willfully” bribing foreign officials and that 
the defendant intended to aid in achieving this object.81  Once again, 
willfulness was not held to require the government to show the defendant 
was aware of a specific law that prohibited his conduct and instead held it 
sufficient that the defendant “act[] deliberately and with the intent to do 
something that the law forbids, that is, with a bad purpose to disobey or 
disregard the law.”82  Like the courts before it, the Second Circuit’s analysis 
conflates the definitions of corruptly and willfully under the FCPA, thereby 
rendering the willfulness requirement surplusage.83  If federal judges 
struggle to understand and accurately interpret the FCPA’s mental state 
requirements and how they work together, SMEs that are new to the global 
marketplace (and the individuals running them) and acting without the 
benefit of sophisticated legal counsel and compliance plans are unlikely to 
be able to effectively guard against liability under the statute. 
B. A TRAP FOR UNSUSPECTING SMALLER BUSINESSES 
The extremely small number of cases interpreting the mental state 
requirements under the FCPA combined with its declared general intent 
status renders compliance for small- and medium-sized enterprises 
extremely difficult.84  Small, unsophisticated companies just entering the 
global marketplace for the first time are not able to seek refuge behind an 
argument of ignorance or a true lack of “willfulness” to commit bribery and 
there are very few cases upon which to rely on when evaluating culpability 
and obligations under the statute.  A company embarking on its first project 
overseas or a company that only does work sporadically abroad will often 
 
79  Id. at 130. 
80  Id. at 136.  
81  Id.  
82  Id. at 135. 
83  “[I]n November [2009] U.S. Judge Shira Scheindlin in Manhattan sentenced him to 
only a year and a day, saying ‘after years of supervising this case, it’s still not entirely clear 
to me whether Mr. Bourke is a victim or a crook.’”  Nathan Vardi, How Federal Crackdown 
on Bribery Hurts Business and Enriches Insiders, FORBES (May 6, 2010), http://www.forbes.
com/forbes/2010/0524/business-weatherford-kbr-corruption-bribery-racket.html. 
84  See Part III.B.2 (defining an SME). 
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lack the institutional knowledge developed through experience with the 
various risks in the project’s home country (including but not limited to the 
level of corruption that exists there).  When international projects make up 
only a small percentage of a business or constitute a new venture entirely, it 
is not necessarily obvious that such ventures require investing millions of 
dollars in developing compliance programs and hiring lawyers for a 
problem that has not yet occurred.  SMEs find themselves in a challenging 
business and legal environment when one combines the lack of experience 
with the price tag of trying to prophylactically prevent activity that falls 
within the broad definition of bribery.  The government used provisions 
from a statute originally passed to target large sophisticated business 
entities, such as oil companies, to prosecute SMEs, which are unprepared 
and unable to defend themselves or institute effective anti-liability 
compliance programs.85 
The FCPA only provides individuals with the protection of a 
“willfulness” requirement for conviction, not businesses.86  This poses 
serious problems for small- and medium-sized businesses.  Smaller 
companies have fewer employees, which makes it more likely that high-
level executives are involved in the everyday, minute decision-making for 
the company.87  In the event of a DOJ investigation and indictment, SMEs 
cannot argue that the mental state of criminal “willfulness” was not present, 
even though the corporate action is more directly attributable to the SME’s 
officers and directors because of how closely held SMEs often are 
compared to large multi-national corporations with expansive subsidiaries.88  
Even if the “willfulness” requirement did apply to closely held businesses, 
the circuit courts have not been clear about which standard of “willfulness” 
 
85  Kovacich, supra note 2935, at 531, 533. 
86  15 U.S.C. § 78dd-2(g)(2)(A) (2012). 
87  Rashna Bhojwani, Deterring Global Bribery: Where Public and Private Enforcement 
Collide, 112 COLUM. L. REV. 66, 73–74 (2012) (citing Kimberly D. Krawiec, Organizational 
Misconduct: Beyond the Principal-Agent Model, 32 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 571, 614 & n.149 
(2005) (“[M]any small organizations sentenced under the Guidelines are ineligible for 
sentence mitigation, due to top-management knowledge of or participation in the 
misconduct.”)). 
88  There is also the problem of the maxim that ignorance of the law is no excuse and the 
individuals running this company will be bound by such a maxim.  But Lipper notes that 
Congress can override this presumption in a statute. Lipper, supra note 40, at 1470–71 
(noting that the Supreme Court has interpreted “willfully” provisions in criminal statutes, 
over the last several decades, to “require, at minimum, that the defendant know that his 
conduct is illegal and often that the defendant know about the specific legal provision which 
he is alleged to have violated”). 
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applies.89  This problem is compounded by confusion among courts 
regarding the differing mental state requirements.90  Even if the 
“willfulness” requirement applied to SMEs as well as individuals, there is 
still confusion in the circuits as to how “willfulness” and “corruptly” differ 
and how to apply them.91  SMEs cannot claim a lack of knowledge of the 
statute and its provisions and prohibitions as a defense, because many 
courts such as the Second Circuit have held that the FCPA is a general 
intent statute.92  Compare this to tax statutes, which courts have repeatedly 
held are specific intent statutes that allow unsophisticated parties to argue 
that they did not fully understand the complex statute and thus were unable 
to comply fully, despite a desire to do so.93  The confusion surrounding the 
FCPA’s mental states and the poor application of those mental states to 
more closely held businesses adds multiple layers of difficulty for SMEs 
attempting to mount a mental state culpability defense against a DOJ 
investigation or indictment. 
In addition, it is not clear that companies are always aware that their 
behavior satisfies the “corruptly” mental state requirement because foreign 
officials, foreign government agents, and foreign business people have 
become more adept at hiding how money is used and where it goes. An 
example is through the use of so-called local experts and consultants.  The 
industries of developing nations are often state-owned or operated, and 
investors in those countries often require the services of “local agents.”94  
These local agents are often well-connected to the foreign government and 
have a strong knowledge of local customs, and because they are difficult to 
supervise, bribes often happen unbeknownst to the foreign government or 
the American company engaging with the agent.95  While it might seem 
logical for American businesses to avoid these types of agents, “[w]ell-
 
89 Kay III, 513 F.3d 432, 447–49 (5th Cir. 2007) (holding that the jury instructions 
satisfied the basic definition of willfulness (committing an act and having knowledge of that 
act) and the intermediate definition of willfulness (committing an act with knowledge that 
the act is unlawful, without actually specifying which was correct under the statute)).  
90  See supra Part II.A for examples. 
91  See supra Part II.A, at notes 55–57. 
92  See supra Part II.A, at note 46. 
93  See, e.g., Cheek v. United States, 498 U.S. 192, 199–200 (1991) (discussing how the 
Court’s prior decisions had interpreted “willfully” in the federal criminal tax laws as an 
exception to the rule that ignorance of the law is no excuse because “[t]he proliferation of 
statutes and regulations has sometimes made it difficult for the average citizen to know and 
comprehend the extent of the duties and obligations imposed by the tax laws”). 
94  Lipper, supra note 40, at 1464–65. 
95  Id.  
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connected local agents are essential to investing in most foreign countries, 
especially those with Byzantine bureaucracies.”96 But in some countries, the 
use of local agents is required.97  The Senate recognized the legitimacy of 
using agents “with personal relationships with government officials” in the 
locality where a company wants to do business.98  To quote businessman 
Gilbert Chagoury—who is “believed to have acted as a middleman” for 
former corrupt Nigerian dictator Sani Abacha—“You have lobbyists; we 
have agents.”99  This reality of doing business in foreign countries not only 
makes bribes more common, but it also increases the likelihood that the 
company and its agents did not act with the requisite mental states: 
corruptly and knowingly. 
SMEs are also less likely to employ legal counsel with the resources 
and experience to effectively counsel on issues of FCPA liability risk.  
Large law and accounting firms are typically well-versed on FCPA liability 
and compliance because they represent large international clients that can 
afford to invest in the research, development, and implementation of 
compliance programs.100  SMEs are less likely to employ these expensive 
firms.101  For example, as Kovacich notes in his article on SMEs, Wisconsin 
and Minnesota businesses are more likely to employ local Midwestern law 
firms that “do not publish and update FCPA literature to educate their 
 
96  Id. at 1486 (citing J. Scott Ballenger et al., Reigning in the Foreign Corrupt Practices 
Act: The Supreme Court Ignores a Perfect Opportunity, 46 No. 4 CRIM. L. BULL. ART 2 
(2010)).  
97  Id. (citing Lisa Middlekauff, To Capitalize on a Burgeoning Market? Issues to 
Consider Before Doing Business in the Middle East, 7 RICH. J. GLOBAL L. & BUS. 159, 170 
(2008)).  
98  S. REP. NO. 100–85, at 52 (1987). 
99  Lipper, supra note 40, at 1486 (quoting Robin Urevich, Chasing the Ghosts of a 
Corrupt Regime, FRONTLINE, (Jan. 8, 2010), http://www.pbs.org/frontlineworld/stories/bribe/
2010/01/nigeria-chasing-the-ghosts-of-a-corrupt-regime.html). 
100  Kovacich, supra note 29, at 544 n. 101 (noting these large law and accounting firms 
“have generated most of the advertisements and educational literature regarding the FCPA 
because recent trends have put significant pressure on [these] firms’ clients”). 
101  “The global market is no longer a playing field just for the large corporation 
[and] . . . [t]he leveling of the playing field is not always prevalent when it comes to 
adequate resources that ensure compliance. The stakes are therefore chancier for privately 
held companies that enter into high-risk markets and expand their international sales than for 
large businesses with resources.”  Deitra Crawley, How Company Size Influences FCPA 
Enforcement, TAYLOR ENGLISH (Mar. 22, 2016), https://www.taylorenglish.com/newsroom-
publications-How-Company-Size-Influences-FCPA-Enforcement-InsideCounsel.html 
(“Most startups begin with a single individual or a small team, and do not have the 
infrastructure to address the complicated risks associated with international business. 
Oftentimes, there is no in- house counsel or specialized staff to navigate the risks.”).  
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clients.”102  Even if an SME wanted to engage a large, experienced law firm 
to aid them in developing a compliance program or investigating potential 
abuses, doing so can often come at too high a price.  Companies often pay 
much more in pre-enforcement action professional fees and expenses than 
they do in penalties or settlement amounts to the government.103  During a 
recent presentation on first-quarter fiscal year 2017 earnings, Wal-Mart 
disclosed $21 million in expenses for ongoing FCPA investigations and 
inquiries and another $4 million in expenses for their global FCPA 
compliance program.104  Large companies such as Wal-Mart can often 
absorb these high costs, but not all SMEs have the same capacity.105  
 
102  Kovacich, supra note 29, at 553. 
103  Mike Koehler, Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Ripples, 3 AM. U. BUS. L. REV. 391, 
396–97 (2014) (“For instance, in the NATCO enforcement action the company agreed to pay 
a $65,000 civil penalty to resolve an SEC enforcement action. The company’s pre-
enforcement action professional fees and expenses were reported to be $ 11 million and 
caused the company cash-flow problems.”); see also Beverley Earle, Because It’s the Bottom 
Line: The Need for Corporate Compliance Programs for Small- and Medium-Size 
Businesses, 25 BUS. F. J. SCH. BUS. & ECON. 3, 3–5 (2000) (discussing the costs associated 
with developing a compliance program through the hiring of expensive lawyers and how 
many SMEs do not understand the incredibly high costs of not having a compliance 
program); Earle & Cava, supra note 5, at 140 (“The smaller companies do not have the 
resources to mount serious compliance efforts and they do not necessarily even appreciate 
the risk they are facing. This study demonstrates the concerns executives have in trying to 
operate within this landscape and still comply with both domestic and foreign laws. 
104  Mike Koehler, Friday Roundup, FCPA PROFESSOR (May 27, 2016), 
http://fcpaprofessor.com/friday-roundup-194/print/ (calculating Wal-Mart’s 1Q FCPA and 
compliance-related costs to be approximately $396,000 per working day); see also The Anti-
Bribery Business, THE ECONOMIST (May 9, 2015), http://www.economist.com/node/
21650557 (discussing how Wal-Mart will pay $800 million by the end of fiscal year 2015 on 
its internal probe into non-trivial allegations of bribery in Mexico and on related compliance 
improvement and by the time the government concludes this investigation which began in 
2012, Wal-Mart’s costs will likely be close to $2 billion).  
  Former DOJ criminal fraud section chief Steven Tyrrell “estimated that a multinational 
company spends, on average, about $2 million to investigate its operations in one country 
and that most investigations span several countries . . . . Smaller investigations for a 
‘specific, discrete issue,’ can cost around $100,000 to $200,000, said Paul McNulty, a 
partner at Baker & McKenzie LLP. But companies have to be prepared to assure the 
government that a problem in one country doesn’t exist in others.”  Joe Palazzolo, FCPA 
Inc.: The Business of Bribery, Corruption Probes Become Profit Center for Big Law Firms, 
WALL ST. J. (Oct. 12, 2012), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB1000087239639044386260457
8028462294611352. 
105  “While major law firms advocate expensive compliance programs to alleviate risk, 
smaller, less sophisticated companies can rarely afford the full panoply of these protections.”  
Matthew W. Muma, Toward Greater Guidance: Reforming the Definitions of the Foreign 
Corrupt Practices Act, 112 MICH. L. REV. 1337, 1347 (2014).  “The international law firm 
Jones Day lists ‘ten questions’ every director should ask herself about FCPA compliance; 
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Because SMEs are less likely to have the resources to invest in compliance 
programs, and are often unaware of just how important they are, they are 
less likely to create a sufficient demand for local law firms to invest in the 
development of literature and compliance programs to help avoid FCPA 
liability.  Compound this reality with the costs of pre-government 
enforcement action and many SMEs become defenseless targets against an 
unchecked and unchallenged government enforcement regime. 
III. THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE’S UNCHECKED AND UNCHALLENGED 
HISTORY OF ENFORCEMENT 
The negative correlation between the frequency of investigations of 
companies by the DOJ and the frequency of actual prosecutions that go to 
trial is not a coincidence.  In fact, throughout the entire course of the 
FCPA’s existence, only two companies of any size have litigated charges to 
a final verdict.106  In both cases, the DOJ lost.  Yet despite these setbacks, 
the DOJ successfully “prosecutes” companies every year without ever 
setting foot in a courtroom. 
The first case the DOJ brought under the FCPA against a company 
occurred when the United States criminally indicted Harris Corporation 
(“Harris”) (a publicly traded company), John D. Iacobucci (Vice President 
and General Manager of the Digital Telephone Systems (“DTS”) division), 
and Ronald L. Schultz (Director of Human Relations and Facilities at DTS, 
Director of Administration at DTS and responsible for Contracts 
Administration) in 1991.107  The defendants were charged with engaging in 
a bribery scheme in violation of the FCPA which targeted a local 
Colombian company owned by a foreign party official, members of the 
national legislature of Colombia, and other local government officials.108  
 
answering the questions with an effective compliance program would not be cheap.”  Id. at 




106  See infra notes 107–117 for a discussion of these two cases. 
107  United States v. Harris Corporation, et al. (N.D. Cal. 1991) at *2 (unpublished case) 
(link to indictment found here: http://www.fcpaprofessor.com/one-win-one-loss and 
https://www.justice.gov/criminal-fraud/case/united-states-v-harris-corporation-et-al-court-
docket-number-90-cr-456).  
108  Mike Koehler, FCPA 101, FCPA PROFESSOR (2012), http://www.fcpaprofessor.com/
one-win-one-loss (citing United States v. Harris Corporation, et al. (N.D. Cal. 1991) at *2–3 
(unpublished case) (link to indictment found here: http://www.fcpaprofessor.com/one-win-
one-loss and https://www.justice.gov/criminal-fraud/case/united-states-v-harris-corporation-
et-al-court-docket-number-90-cr-456)). 
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The criminal trial began on March 4, 1991.109  After the prosecution 
presented its case, Judge Charles Legge granted a directed verdict of 
acquittal because “‘no reasonable’ jury could convict the company nor its 
executives on any of the five bribery-related counts for which they were 
indicted” due to insufficient evidence showing that the defendants intended 
to enter into a criminal conspiracy.110 
The second case occurred two decades later when the government filed 
a first superseding indictment against Lindsey Manufacturing Company and 
two individuals with conspiracy to violate the FCPA and substantive 
violations of the FCPA.111  Lindsey is a small, privately-owned company 
that manufactures equipment used by electrical utility companies.112 The 
Lindsey defendants allegedly paid bribes to two high-level employees of an 
electric utility company wholly-owned by the Mexican Government.113  
Lindsey made payments to the employees through their company as 
commissions for services when in reality, the money was used for bribe 
payments.114  After the jury convicted the defendants on all counts,115 the 
court conducted a hearing in response to multiple motions filed by 
defendants alleging prosecutorial misconduct.116  The court ultimately threw 
out the convictions of all defendants and dismissed the first superseding 
indictment after finding the government had 
allowed a key FBI agent to testify untruthfully before the grand jury, inserted material 
falsehoods into affidavits submitted to magistrate judges in support of applications for 
search warrants and seizure warrants, improperly reviewed e-mail communications 
between one Defendant and her lawyer, recklessly failed to comply with its discovery 
obligations, posed questions to certain witnesses in violation of the Court’s rulings, 
engaged in questionable behavior during closing argument and even made 
misrepresentations to the Court.117 
While not completely clear, it seems unlikely that the government would 
 
109  Id.  
110  Jim Doyle, Judge Tosses Out Overseas Bribery Case, S. F. CHRON., Mar. 20, 1991, 
at B6.   
111  United States v. Aguilar, 831 F. Supp. 2d 1180, 1182 (C.D. Cal. 2011).  
112  Id.  
113  Id. at 1183.  
114  Id. at 1183. 
115  Press Release, Dep’t of Just., California Company, Its Two Executives and 
Intermediary Convicted by Federal Jury in Los Angeles on All Counts for Their Involvement 
in Scheme to Bribe Officials at State-Owned Electrical Utility in Mexico (May 10, 2011), 
http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/california-company-its-two-executives-and-intermediary-
convicted-federal-jury-los-angeles-all.  
116  Aguilar, 831 F. Supp. 2d at 1182. 
117  Id. 
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have secured a conviction without engaging in the above-mentioned 
misconduct.  While these two cases seem like milestones in the history of 
the FCPA that would impact the government’s enforcement strategies, that 
has not been the case.  This directed verdict of acquittal and vacated 
conviction tandem has not emboldened companies to challenge the 
government in court on interpretations of key provisions of the FCPA, and 
these setbacks have not deterred the DOJ and SEC from pursuing an 
aggressive enforcement strategy against companies suspected of violating 
the FCPA.118  So far, no company has wanted to challenge the government 
in open court because the “bet the firm” stakes are so high given the DOJ 
and SEC possess unbridled authority with regard to the fines and penalties 
they assess.119 
A. THE ENFORCEMENT ENVIRONMENT OUTSIDE THE COURT SYSTEM 
The DOJ has created an enforcement environment in which many of 
its FCPA enforcement and liability theories do not undergo judicial scrutiny 
on a regular basis.120  Beginning in 1997, the DOJ and SEC began adopting 
“a more aggressive approach to investigating and prosecuting FCPA 
violations.”121  The number of enforcement actions brought by both entities 
combined more than doubled to five in 2004, more than doubled again in 
2005 with twelve actions, and substantially more than doubled in 2007 
when thirty-eight actions were brought compared to the fifteen actions 
 
118  No companies have gone all the way through to a jury trial on any issues related to 
an allegation of FCPA violations since the conclusion of these two cases.  See infra Part 
III.A for a discussion of how the government has continued to ramp up its enforcement 
actions under the FCPA in spite of these two company victories years ago.  
119  See Ashby Jones, FCPA: Company Costs Mount for Fighting Corruption, WALL ST. 
J., Oct. 2, 2012, http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB1000087239639044475250457802489398
8048764 (suggesting that few cases end up in court because most are settled which means 
“there are few judicial decisions to guide corporate legal departments” which then in turn 
discourages future litigation).  
Even those [companies] that do have a good case are scared to fight and risk a criminal 
indictment that would clobber their share price. It is commercially rational to roll over, all the 
more so given how severely any failure to co-operate is punished. Ask Marubeni of Japan, whose 
coyness towards the DOJ led to its being forced to plead guilty and pay an elevated fine. This 
hands prosecutors a lot of discretion.  
The Anti-Bribery Business, supra note 104 (“‘The FCPA often means what enforcement 
agencies say it means,’ says [Mike] Koehler. ‘We have only a façade of enforcement.’”). 
120  Mike Koehler, Big, Bold, and Bizarre: The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Enters A 
New Era, 43 U. TOL. L. REV. 99, 126 (2011).  
121  WARIN ET AL, supra note 37, at A-25.  
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brought in 2006.122  This number continued to rise until 2010, when the 
government brought a record seventy-four actions.123  This Comment 
focuses more on the DOJ Fraud Section, which is able to bring both civil 
and criminal enforcement actions while the SEC is limited to civil actions.  
As these enforcement actions increased, the DOJ developed several 
methods of resolution: declination, non-prosecution agreement (NPA), 
deferred prosecution agreement (DPA), plea agreement, or trial before a 
judge or jury.124 
For some companies, admitting guilt through a plea bargain is the most 
advised route by counsel under the circumstances.  But if possible, a 
company will make an effort to enter into a DPA or an NPA because they 
allow a company to avoid admitting guilt.  Under a DPA, the DOJ or SEC 
will still “file a charging document with the court, while simultaneously 
requesting that the prosecution be deferred for a period of time (typically 
two or three years) during which the company may demonstrate its good 
conduct.”125  Alternatively, NPAs are maintained by the parties outside of 
the judicial system, though most are made available to the public on the 
DOJ and SEC websites, which preserves the government’s right to file 
charges later on if the company or individual fails to comply.126 
Under this regime, the primary statutory interpretive function is 
performed almost exclusively by the DOJ Fraud Section and the SEC.  Over 
time, the ratio of complaints filed in federal court to in-house administrative 
proceedings has completely reversed.  For example, in 2010, the SEC filed 
twenty-five civil complaints in federal courts and only two in-house 
administrative proceedings, while in 2012, the SEC filed eleven civil 
complaints and one in-house administrative proceeding.127  But in 2014, the 
SEC filed just one civil complaint in federal court and eight in-house 
 
122  Id. 
123  Id. See infra notes 131–134 for a discussion of this trend and corresponding trends in 
average resolutions amounts.  
124  WARIN ET AL., supra note 37, at A-28 (citing RESOURCE GUIDE, supra note 9 at 74–
75; U.S. ATTORNEY’S MANUAL 9-28.300, 9-28.1000, 9-28.1300).  
125  Id. at A-28 (explaining that a DPA will require a defendant to “(1) pay a monetary 
penalty, (2) waive the statute of limitations, (3) cooperate with the government, (4) admit 
relevant facts, and (5) commit to certain compliance and remediation terms”); see RESOURCE 
GUIDE, supra note 9, at 74.  
126  WARIN ET AL., supra note 37, at A-28 (requiring similar concessions as outlined in 
n.125 for DPAs).  
127  2014 Year-End FCPA Update, GIBSON DUNN 6–7 (Jan. 5, 2015), http://www.gibson
dunn.com/publications/pages/2014-Year-End-FCPA-Update.aspx [hereinafter Gibson 2014 
FCPA Update]. 
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administrative proceedings.128  The DOJ and SEC are removing more and 
more investigations and subsequent cases from the purview of Article III 
courts.  There was also a meteoric rise in the DOJ and SEC combined 
enforcement actions from twelve (7 DOJ / 5 SEC split) in 2005 to seventy-
four (48 DOJ / 26 SEC split) in 2010.129  And while the statistics have 
leveled off somewhat in the last three years with twenty-three (11 DOJ / 12 
SEC split) in 2012, twenty-seven (19 DOJ / 8 SEC split) in 2013, and 
twenty-six (17 DOJ/9 SEC split) in 2014, these numbers are still very high 
when compared to the roughly thirty years of government FCPA 
enforcement.130 
This increase of enforcement actions outside of the formal judicial 
process translates to enormous monetary penalties, and damages assessed 
without a formal finding of guilt by a judge or jury.  The DOJ and SEC 
assessed a combined $1.8 billion in corporate fines, penalties and 
disgorgement in 2010 compared to $300,000 in 2000 FCPA enforcement.131  
Prior to 2005, the single largest corporate monetary resolution between the 
government and a company occurred in 1995 when Lockheed Corporation 
paid $24.8 million.132  But since the post-2005 enforcement boom, the 
average corporate monetary resolution has only dipped below $25 million 
four times.133  At the peak of the DOJ and SEC enforcement boom in 2010 
(quantity of actions brought), the average resolution was $81,860,000.134  In 
2015, the number of resolutions was one-third the number that occurred in 
2010 (74 resolutions), and yet 2015 saw an average corporate resolution of 
$156,610,000.135  This is partially attributable to use of disgorgement.136  
 
128  Id.  
129  Id. at 2. 
130  Id. 
131  Koehler, supra note 120, at 100–04. 
132  Gibson 2014 FCPA Update, supra note 127, at 3; “Early FCPA penalties imposed on 
corporations ranged from a few hundred thousand to a few million dollars.”  WARIN ET AL., 
supra note 37, at A-25–26 (citing examples of judgments and plea agreements from the 
1980s and early 1990s).  
133  Gibson 2014 FCPA Update, supra note 127, at 3 (noting the average resolution 
dipped below $25 million in 2005, 2006, 2007, and 2012). 
134  Id. at 2–3. 
135  Id. 
136  “Disgorgement is a civil remedy with roots in the traditional equitable remedies of 
restitution and recoupment.  Imposition of the disgorgement remedy requires corporations 
subject to FCPA liability to forfeit the amount of ‘ill-gotten’ arising from the bribery at 
issue. Use of the disgorgement remedy is a recent but growing practice on the part of the 
SEC.”  Matthew C. Turk, A Political Economy Approach to Reforming the Foreign Corrupt 
Practices Act, 33 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 325, 336 (2013). 
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Disgorgement was not considered an available remedial action at the 
government’s disposal from the passage of the FCPA.137  It was never 
sought by the SEC in the first twenty-seven years of the FCPA’s 
existence.138  Since 2004, the SEC has sought disgorgement in almost every 
case and in 2010, “ninety-six percent of the proceeds from SEC FCPA 
settlements consisted of disgorgement and prejudgment interest, a total 
amounting to approximately $500 million.”139  Like many aspects of the 
FCPA, the SEC’s authority to seek disgorgement has gone unchallenged in 
federal courts.140  The government determines the possible maximum 
penalty it can assess under the Sentencing Guidelines and Alternative 
Minimum Fines Act, which is then used to increase fines above the FCPA-
mandated limits to twice the amount the offender stood to gain through his 
or her illicit financial transaction.141  If a company wishing to avoid bet-the-
company litigation feels this is too high, either because they do not believe 
their conduct violated the FCPA or because they believe their conduct was 
not that egregious, the government often responds by pointing out that they 
could indict a company for as many violations as alleged bribes were made 
and seek the $2,000,000 statutory maximum fine for each such violation.  
This number is often much larger than that calculated under the Sentencing 
Guidelines, so companies agree to the increased fines.  It is unclear if an 
indictment structured this way would hold up in court. 
While there is a trend away from criminal or civil litigation, arguably 
by both the authorities and the companies involved, there is an increasing 
number of guilty pleas at the same time.  From 1990 to 2007, the vast 
majority of FCPA cases “yielded settlements before the parties adjudicated 
any criminal issues in court” and the government “disposed of 77% of the 
investigations through non-prosecution agreements and pleas, while only 14 
 
137  Id. at 337 (“While not explicitly disallowed by the FCPA, the ‘lack of any statement 
that disgorgement should be part of the SEC’s enforcement arsenal, and the rarity of the 
remedy at the time that Congress passed the FCPA and its amendments’ have led some to 
question the propriety of the remedy. As with many aspects of the FCPA, the exact contours 
of the SEC’s disgorgement authority have never been tested in court.’”). 
138  Id. at 336. 
139  Id. 
140  Id. at 336–37 (discussing the SEC’s theory of statutory interpretation to justify 
disgorgement as an FCPA remedy and the legal and practical problems arising from this 
tenuous interpretation).  
141  18 U.S.C. § 3571(d) (2012).  Of course, the government is only supposed to assess 
this fine increase when supported by evidence and the offender pleads guilty or is proven 
guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. 18 U.S.C. § 3571(a) (2012) (“In General.—A defendant 
who has been found guilty of an offense may be sentenced to pay a fine.”). 
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investigations resulted in convictions, dismissals, or acquittals.”142  More 
recently, the DOJ and SEC have moved away from settling cases through 
DPAs or NPAs and instead seek plea agreements from corporate 
defendants.  For example, only two of DOJ’s seven corporate enforcement 
actions in 2013 resulted in plea agreements, and in 2014, five of DOJ’s 
seven corporate enforcement actions resulted in guilty pleas.143  “While the 
distinction between plea agreements, deferred prosecution agreements, and 
non-prosecution agreements may be minor in substance and consequence, 
the government’s decision to extract a guilty plea is generally understood to 
be a harsher form of corporate punishment.”144 
B. THE PROBLEMS ASSOCIATED WITH INSUFFICIENT LITIGATION 
Too little litigation on a statute like the FCPA can sometimes lead to 
improper or undesirable interpretive results.  Many terms and provisions of 
the FCPA remain unapplied by district courts and juries, leading to a dearth 
of appellate case law examining the ambiguities left by Congress.  In the 
case of the FCPA, the statutory interpretation is left to the DOJ and SEC 
through rulemaking and administrative proceedings.  One might initially 
miss the issue of concern.  The problem is not that the DOJ and SEC are 
completely incapable of interpreting congressional directives from a statute 
and filling in any remaining holes.  Rather, the problem is that the DOJ and 
SEC have skin in the game—the FCPA has become extremely lucrative for 
these governmental bodies.145  And government attorneys who perpetuate 
this enforcement regime go into private practice to represent companies and 
build up very successful white-collar practices.146 
 
142  Kovacich, supra note 29, at 546 n.112 (citing Recent Trends and Patterns in FCPA 
Enforcement, SHEARMAN & STERLING, LLP 7 (2008), http://www.shearman.com/~/media/
Files/Old-Site-Files/LIT_FCPA_Trends_121208.pdf (indicating a desire on behalf of 
companies and authorities alike for quick disposal methods that generate little public or 
industry attention respectively) [hereinafter Shearman Recent Trends 2008]). 
143  Recent Trends and Patterns in FCPA Enforcement, SHEARMAN & STERLING, LLP 4 
(Jan. 5, 2015), http://www.shearman.com/~/media/Files/NewsInsights/Publications/2015/01/
Recent-Trends-and-Patterns-only-LT-010515.pdf [hereinafter Shearman Recent Trends 
2015].   
144  Id.  
145  See supra Part III.A for discussion of the massive criminal penalties the DOJ and 
SEC are assessing and collecting. 
146  “‘This is good business for law firms,’ says Joseph Covington, who headed the 
Justice Department’s FCPA efforts in the 1980s and is now codirector of white-collar 
defense at Jenner & Block. ‘This is good business for accounting firms, it’s good business 
for consulting firms, the media–and Justice Department lawyers who create the marketplace 
and then get yourself a job.’”  Nathan Vardi, How Federal Crackdown on Bribery Hurts 
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1. The Government’s Enforcement Regime is not Interchangeable with Case 
Law and Perpetuates the Lack of Case Law 
The lack of judicial oversight has bred an environment marked by 
over-enforcement and a lack of transparency.  There are indications that the 
DOJ’s activity would be reined in if challenged in court.  For example, 
while the penalties assessed against corporate defendants outside the court 
system have sky-rocketed over the past five to ten years, the number of 
individuals penalized in court has actually decreased.147  Of the forty-two 
individual defendants sentenced to prison terms for violations of the FCPA 
since 2010, only five of those defendants received sentences within the 
Sentencing Guidelines range—most received shorter sentences.148  
Individuals have incentives to contest the government’s allegations of 
FCPA violations because of the loss of personal liberty they face.  The 
number of individuals receiving prison sentences lower than the 
recommended guideline ranges suggests that either the government is 
cutting deals with individuals for more information or the courts are 
providing a bulwark against overzealous prosecution.  The latter possibility 
begs the question of what corporate criminal fines (and civil fines imposed 
by the SEC) might look like if reviewed and imposed by courts rather than 
the DOJ through DPAs, NPAs, and settlements. 
Deputy Attorney General Paul McNulty issued a revised memorandum 
(the “McNulty Memorandum”) of guidelines for companies in 2006 which 
laid out factors the DOJ considers when deciding whether to prosecute and 
how a company can cooperate to avoid higher levels of liability.149  These 
discretionary factors are supposed to help determine whether a company 
deserves cooperation credits and whether the DOJ should prosecute.150  
Some factors include “the sufficiency of the evidence; the likelihood of 
success at trial; the probable deterrent, rehabilitative, and other 
consequences of conviction; and the adequacy of noncriminal 
 
Business and Enriches Insiders, FORBES (May 6, 2010), http://www.forbes.com/forbes/2010/
0524/business-weatherford-kbr-corruption-bribery-racket.html.   
147  WARIN ET AL., supra note 37, at A-30; Shearman Recent Trends 2015, supra note 
143, at 2 (depicting the number of individuals criminally penalized by the DOJ declining 
from 44 individuals in 2009 to 12 individuals in 2014 (most of whom received prison 
sentences)).  
148  WARIN ET AL, supra note 37, at A-30.  
149  Memorandum from Paul McNulty, Deputy Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Just. to Head of 
Dep’t Components & United States Att’ys. (Dec. 12, 2006), http://www.usdoj.gov/dag/
speeches/2006/mcnulty_memo.pdf [hereinafter McNulty Memorandum]. 
150  Id. at 4. 
6. LAUDONE 3/1/2017  5:55 PM 
2016] FCPA: UNBRIDLED ENFORCEMENT 385 
approaches.”151  Other corporation-specific factors considered are “the 
nature and seriousness of the offense, including the risk of harm to the 
public, . . . the existence and adequacy of the corporation’s pre-existing 
compliance program, . . . [and the] collateral consequences, including 
disproportionate harm to shareholders . . . and [the] impact on the 
public.”152  
The problem with the McNulty Memorandum is that it fails to restrain 
prosecutors in any meaningful way—prosecutors are only instructed to 
“consider the sufficiency of the evidence and the likelihood of success at 
trial.”153  The government does not need to seriously consider whether the 
evidence would be sufficient to win at trial because both the government 
and many companies push for settlement under the current enforcement 
environment.154  The pressure to settle is especially felt by smaller 
companies who cannot afford the expense and cost to their reputation that 
public litigation brings and who rarely have the ability to invest in 
developing a rigorous compliance program to help mitigate the DOJ’s 
desire to prosecute.155  Because the government knows companies are 
unlikely to pursue litigation in light of this “robust settlement history,” there 
is even more of an incentive for the government to unfairly “consider the 
weight of the evidence and whether it supports success at trial.”156  In 
addition, the government’s use of these agreements (DPAs, NPAs, and 
settlements) allows it to “receive facts from potential defendants in 
exchange for a diversion agreement [and then] weave the facts into 
convincing narratives.”157  The threat of this settlement regime is felt even 
more by SMEs than large corporations with significantly greater resources 
to devote to litigation and settlement. 
This hostile enforcement environment for SMEs is only exacerbated 
by the fact that the DOJ and SEC have essentially read many of the safety 
valves and affirmative defenses out of the FCPA.  For example, the 
 
151  Id. 
152  Id.  
153  Kovacich, supra note 29, at 561. 
154  See The Anti-Bribery Business, supra note 104 (discussing how even companies with 
good cases chose not to litigate in court against the government because of the financial cost 
and share price risks). 
155  Kovacich, supra note 29, at 561–62.  
156  Id. 
157  Eldridge, supra note 58, at 750 (noting that this feature of the enforcement regime 
allows the government to “overcome evidentiary difficulties [and] enforce the FCPA when it 
may not have a strong chance of success under evidentiary burdens or the FCPA’s provisions 
at trial”). 
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statutory exception for facilitating payments exception allows for a 
facilitating or expediting payment to be made for the purpose of securing 
performance of a routine governmental action.158  The DOJ has read this 
exception very narrowly, interpreting that it is difficult for companies to 
claim the exception in an enforcement context.159  In 2008, Westinghouse 
Air Brake Technologies Corporation self-reported FCPA violations to the 
DOJ and SEC.160  Some of the alleged payments certainly constituted a 
violation, but the NPA stated that Westinghouse made one payment of less 
than $100 to the standards and certification agency in India to “ensure that 
inspections would be scheduled and performed and to obtain certificates 
usually issued upon delivery of conforming products.”161  This agency was 
responsible for conducting inspections of finished products prior to 
shipping and despite this looking like the kind of facilitating payment the 
exemption was created to protect, the DOJ listed it as a violation in the 
NPA.162  The DOJ and SEC have successfully eliminated the majority of 
judicial oversight and are now capable of circumventing congressional 
intent by selecting which provisions of the FCPA are to be interpreted 
narrowly and which are to be interpreted broadly.  These determinations 
then govern companies interacting with the DOJ and SEC.163 
 
158  15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1(b), 78dd-2(b), 78dd-3(b) (2012).  
159  See generally Earle & Cava, supra note 5, at 139 (discussing the confusion 
surrounding the facilitating payments exception under the FCPA based on government 
enforcement trends and the DOJ’s ineffective opinion procedure releases):  
Very obviously, the private sector is confused by the state of the law both in the United States 
and abroad; predictably, it is reacting in a rather rational manner. The Deloitte Anticorruption 
Practices Survey 2011 of 276 executives revealed that 47% of companies prohibited facilitating 
payments in all cases, 36% allowed them with preapproval and only 5% allowed them with no 
restrictions. Of the combined percentage of companies that permit some type of facilitating 
payment, 4% allowed between $250-$499; 7% allowed up to $500; 13% percent allowed $100-
$249; 23% allowed under $100; and 53% had no restrictions. 
Id. at 139–40 (italics omitted). 
160  Press Release, Dep’t of Just., Westinghouse Air Brake Technologies Corporation 
Agrees to Pay $300,000 Penalty to Resolve Foreign Bribery Violations in India (Feb. 14, 
2008), https://www.justice.gov/criminal-fraud/case/re-westinghouse-air-brake-technologies-
corporation-2008.  
161  WARIN ET AL., supra note 37, at A-17–18. 
162  Id. at A-18; see also Non Prosecution Agreement, In Re Westinghouse Air Brake 
Technologies Corporation, at Appendix A 3–4 (Feb. 8, 2008), https://www.justice.gov/
criminal-fraud/case/re-westinghouse-air-brake-technologies-corporation-2008 (showing that 
the DOJ merely asserted in its statement of facts the existence of the payments to insure the 
foreign agency “would schedule and perform inspections” followed by the claim that such 
payments were unlawful). 
163  “Due to the lack of FCPA case law, corporations and individuals necessarily relied 
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The nature of this extra-judicial enforcement regime means that the 
government has created a lucrative revenue stream with little connection to 
victims of overseas bribery by American companies and American citizens.  
In fact, none of the money goes to actual victims of the bribery in any given 
case through restitution.164  And the U.S. Treasury has a weak case that it is 
actually harmed by the bribery. One could argue that bribery has the 
potential to interfere with the aims of foreign aid grants, economic 
competition, or particular policy goals of the political branches; however, 
there are causation challenges when trying to link one act of bribery to one 
of those potential harms.165  Increasingly, the highest fines imposed by the 
DOJ are actually being assessed against international companies more so 
than domestic ones, which was not the original purpose of the FCPA.166  
The government is unlikely to voluntarily decrease or eliminate this 
revenue stream given its profitability.  In the DOJ Civil Division’s 2013 
budget justification, the DOJ referred to itself as the “profit center of the 
U.S. Treasury.”167 Recently, the DOJ’s former Assistant Chief for FCPA 
enforcement admitted: “the government sees a profitable program, [and] it’s 
going to ride that horse until it can’t ride it anymore.”168 
Settlements are the vehicle by which the DOJ generates a strong 
revenue stream.  The punishments against companies are incredibly heavy, 
even in the case of settlements, with the typical range between $20-30 
million and a high of $800 million.169  With these ranges and possible jail 
 
on agency guidance documents and published settlement agreements to inform their conduct 
and avoid liability. As a result, these materials became de facto agency jurisprudence.”  
Barry J. Pollack & Annie Wartanian Reisinger, Lone Wolf or the Start of A New Pack: 
Should the FCPA Guidance Represent A New Paradigm in Evaluating Corporate Criminal 
Liability Risks?, 51 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 121, 131 (2014).  
164  See generally Turk, supra note 136. 
165  Id. at 338 (pointing out that even an argument that shareholders are “victimized” by 
corporate bribes falls flat considering most bribes are used to procure business overseas and 
increase corporate profits). 
166  Id. at 342. See supra Part I.A regarding the original purpose of the FCPA. 
167  Turk, supra note 136, at 353 & notes 154–155 (citing Civil Div., U.S. Dep’t of Just., 
FY 2013 Budget and Performance Plans 23 (2012), http:// www.justice.gov/jmd/2013
justification/pdf/fy13-civ-justification.pdf; Criminal Div., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, FY 2011 
President’s Budget 20-22 (2010), http://www.justice.gov/jmd/2011justification/pdf/fy11-
crm-justification.pdf (“requesting more FCPA staff while noting that ‘the [Criminal] 
Division’s FCPA prosecutions have resulted in fines and penalties totaling more than $1 
billion’”)). 
168  Id. at 362–63 (citing Joseph Rosenbloom, Here Come the Payoff Police, AM. LAW. 
(May 17, 2011), http://www.americanlawyer.com/id=1202457704533/Here-Come-the-
Payoff-Police (quoting William Jacobson, former Assistant Chief at the DOJ)). 
169  Matthew W. Muma, Toward Greater Guidance: Reforming the Definitions of the 
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time for individual defendants, corporate defendants do not want to take the 
risk of going to trial.170 “[T]he DOJ and SEC both actively punish 
noncompliance; companies faced with possible DOJ investigation are 
generally quick to settle because the agencies treat fighting the charges as 
noncompliance.”171  And if large, multinational corporations are passing up 
the opportunity to challenge the DOJ’s and SEC’s allegations due to the 
heavy penalties being threatened, SMEs stand little chance of surviving 
when forced to choose between litigating and accepting a settlement.  It 
becomes a lose-lose situation. 
Defenders of the current enforcement regime might point to the DOJ’s 
FCPA opinion releases as a viable replacement for case law.  While these 
opinion releases are required by statute and are supposed to aid companies 
in complying with the FCPA, they fall far short, in benefits and quality, of 
case law.172  In fact, the statute states the DOJ “shall establish a procedure 
to provide responses to specific inquiries by domestic concerns concerning 
conformance of their conduct with the Department of Justice’s present 
enforcement policy . . . [and] within 30 days after receiving such a request, 
issue an opinion in response to that request.”173  The opinions are supposed 
to inform the company whether or not the specified prospective conduct 
would violate the FCPA.174  But recently, DOJ opinions responding to these 
anonymous requests for guidance have become “scarce, slow in coming, 
and highly general (since they do not name the countries to which they 
refer).”175  Were these opinion releases frequent and applicable beyond the 
 
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 112 MICH. L. REV. 1337, 1344 (2014) (citing Mike Koehler, 
The Façade of FCPA Enforcement, 41 GEO. J. INT’L L. 907, 924–25 (2010)); see, e.g., Plea 
Agreement at 17, United States v. Bridgestone Corp., No. 4:11-CR-00651 (S.D. Tex. Oct. 5, 
2011) (fine of $28 million); Deferred Prosecution Agreement at 9, United States v. Shell 
Nigeria Exploration & Prod. Co., No. 4:10-CR-00767 (S.D. Tex. Nov. 4, 2010) (fine of $30 
million); Press Release, Dep’t of Just., Siemens AG and Three Subsidiaries Plead Guilty to 
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Violations and Agree to Pay $450 Million in Combined 
Criminal Fines (Dec. 15, 2008), http:// www.justice.gov/archive/opa/pr/2008/December/08-
crm-1105.html. 
170  Muma, supra note 169, at 1344 (citing Koehler, supra note 169, at 940). 
171  Id. (citing Koehler, supra note 169, at 926–29). 
172  15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1(e)(1), -2(f)(1) (2012). 
173  Id. § 78dd-2(f)(1).  
174  Id. 
175  Muma, supra note 169, at 1344–45, 1345 n.50 (“The DOJ has only released a total of 
ten opinions in the last five years.” See Opinion Procedure Releases, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., 
http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/opinion/ (last visited Nov. 22, 2015)); see, e.g., 
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Review No. 12-01 (U.S. Dep’t of Just. Sept. 18, 2012) 
(opinion proc. release), http:// www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/opinion/2012/1201.pdf 
(issued a full seven months after the initial request and “based on the facts as represented by 
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individual set of circumstances, then perhaps a stronger case could be made 
that they are fungible with case law.  Opinion releases and settlements 
(including plea agreements, DPAs, and NPAs) have helped build an 
environment where precedent does not carry the guiding force typically 
associated with case law, and companies lack clarity on a host of 
interpretive questions as well.176  Case law is needed for uniformity in the 
enforcement regime and to uphold the rule of law. 
2. The Enforcement Regime’s Negative Impact on SMEs 
The current DOJ and SEC enforcement regime, with its host of flaws, 
has and can have a negative impact on SMEs.  The average SME may be 
unaware of the existence of the FCPA, let alone its current reach, because 
of the lack of public visibility of the statute due to the high settlement rates.  
In addition, many local law firms representing SMEs do not have robust 
FCPA practices and experience detecting bribery risks or developing 
compliance plans. Further, there is a lack of case law for local law firms to 
rely on if a SME client sought to expand its knowledge on the subject.177  
Kovacich discusses how corrupt business practices are often “very complex 
schemes involving kickbacks, discounts, and other subtle methods of 
securing foreign business contracts that straddle the line of acceptability and 
corruption,” which make detecting such corrupt business practices 
challenging and expensive.178  All of these factors make for treacherous 
waters for an SME looking to enter the global marketplace. 
As early as 2007, the DOJ and SEC began focusing on SMEs engaging 
in global trade.179  International Business Machines Corporation (IBM) 
 
the Requestor,” thereby making it inapplicable to a wide variety of similar situations).  
176  See, e.g., Koehler, supra note 169, at 984–90 (discussing the similar facts but 
materially different outcomes between the December 2007 enforcement action against 
Lucent Technologies, Inc. (“agree[d] to pay $2.5 million in total fines and penalties for 
merely FCPA books and records and internal controls violations—that is, no anti-bribery 
violations”) and the December 2009 enforcement action against UTStarcom, Inc. (“settled its 
matter by agreeing to pay $3 million in total fines and penalties for FCPA anti-bribery, 
books and records and internal control violations”) (emphasis in original)).  
177  Kovacich, supra note 29, at 553–54; see also supra Part II.B. 
178  Kovacich, supra note 29, at 530 (noting that in addition to sophisticated schemes that 
involve charitable donations, payments to reduce tax, and custom duties and payments for 
government reports and certifications, many potential bribery situations are complicated by 
cultural differences in the foreign country). 
179  Mike Koehler, FCPA Compliance – It’s Not Just For Big Companies, FCPA 
PROFESSOR (May 7, 2015), http://fcpaprofessor.com/fcpa-compliance-its-not-just-for-big-
companies/ (providing a list of SMEs the government has brought enforcement actions 
against since 2007).  
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defines an SME as a company that falls within one of two tiers: companies 
within the 100 to 1,000 employee range, and companies that range from 
1,000 to 5,000 employees.180  The U.S. Small Business Association defines 
a small business as having 500 employees or less for most manufacturing 
and mining industries and $7.5 million in average annual receipts for 
nonmanufacturing industries, with some industry-based exceptions.181  The 
FCPA does not explicitly adopt any definition of an SME, nor does it 
explicitly indicate that the statute applies differently to companies of 
differing size and characteristics (i.e., private versus publicly traded).182  
And the U.S. government does not have a universally accepted definition of 
SMEs that is used across agencies and departments.183 
In theory, the DOJ and SEC have had the authority to investigate and 
prosecute SMEs engaged in overseas bribery of foreign officials since the 
passage of the FCPA in 1977 because the FCPA does not expressly limit its 
application to the large corporations who were committing the bribery that 
spurred its passage.184  In 1988, the FCPA amendments created the 
procedure for issuing general guidelines and advisory opinions for the 
purpose of providing enforcement policy guidance to potential “exporters 
and small businesses that are unable to obtain specialized counsel.”185  But 
as discussed earlier,186 the use of these advisory opinions and the guidelines 
themselves only provide advice on a modicum of the myriad situations that 
can arise in global commerce where bribery might occur.   
Complying with the statute, and more specifically the DOJ and SEC 
standards, is often cost prohibitive for SMEs.187  It can be incredibly 
 
180  Kovacich, supra note 29, at 531 n.13. 
181  Summary of Size Standards by Industry Sector, U.S. SMALL BUS. ASS’N, (current as 
of July 14, 2014) https://www.sba.gov/content/summary-size-standards-industry-sector (last 
visited Nov. 22, 2015).  
182  See, e.g., Kovacich, supra note 29, at 530.   
183  See Small- and medium-Sized Enterprises: Overview of Participation in U.S. 
Exports, supra note 2.  
184  See supra Part I.A at notes 14–17. 
185  H.R. REP. NO. 100-576, at 923 (1988); see also Impact of Foreign Corrupt Practice 
Act on U.S. Business: Comptroller’s General Report to the Congress of the United States, 
U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE 116 (1981), http://www.gao.gov/assets/140/132199.pdf (last 
visited Sept. 17, 2016).   
186  See supra Part III.B.1 at notes 37–39, 172–176. 
187  Kovacich, supra note 29, at 544 n.101; see, e.g., Koehler, supra note 120, at 106 
(citing the example of Team Inc. described below).  
 Consider for example, when in October 2010, Team Inc. ($12.3 million net income in 
2010) disclosed $3.2 million in professional costs associated with an FCPA investigation 
focused on payments over a five-year period totaling less than $50,000 in a branch office to 
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challenging to determine if a foreign entity is controlled in any way by the 
government of that country and finding out such information without 
offending global business partners can be impossible.188  And in situations 
where bribery does occur, it is often perpetrated solely by the foreign 
government unbeknownst to the company—for example, through the use of 
local agents—making the unsophisticated company arguably a victim as 
well.189  When a company is investigated and prosecuted by the DOJ, the 
Federal Sentencing Guidelines are used to enact punishment on companies 
based on aggravating and mitigating factors.190  The Sentencing Guidelines 
take into account the size of a company, and as a result, SMEs will receive 
a lower culpability score which helps lessen the punishment.191  But “there 
are only two mitigating factors: (1) the existence of an effective compliance 
and ethics program and (2) self-reporting, cooperation, or acceptance of 
responsibility,” and as discussed next, SMEs often do not have compliance 
programs and may be unaware when they are involved in an act of 
bribery.192  Any benefit received based on size will often be offset in the 
context of an SME because “if high-level officials in the company were 
involved in the misconduct, the company cannot receive the benefit of [a] 
mitigation factor.”193 In small companies, the odds increase that senior 
officials will be involved in international deals and activity and are thus 
party to the alleged bribe, whether knowingly or not.194  Many SMEs are 
unable to invest in sophisticated compliance plans like the ones created by 
international law firms for large companies.195  However, it is difficult for 
smaller companies to pass up on international opportunities to grow their 
 
employees of foreign government owned enterprises in Trinidad.  These improper payments 
represent one-half of one percent of the Team Inc.’s overall revenue.  TEAM INC., 
QUARTERLY REPORT (Form 10-Q), at 34 (Oct. 8, 2010), https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/
data/318833/000119312510226805/d10q.htm#tx100438_8; TEAM INC., REPORT FOR THE 
FISCAL YEAR ENDED MAY 31, 2010 (Form 10-K), at 34 (Oct. 8, 2010), https://www.sec.gov/
Archives/edgar/data/318833/000119312510181451/d10k.htm. 
188  Kovacich, supra note 29, at 566. 
189  See supra Part II.B, notes 94–99.  
190  See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 8C2.5(b)–(g) (2010) (instructing 
companies to “apply subsections (b) through (g) [(aggravating and mitigating factors)]” to 
determine final culpability score). 
191  Bhojwani, supra note 87, at 73–74.  
192  Id. at 73 (referencing U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 8C2.5(f)–(g)); see 
also supra Part II.B at notes 62–68. 
193  Bhojwani, supra note 87, at 73 (referencing U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL 
§ 8C2.5(f)). 
194  Id. at 73–74. 
195  Muma, supra note 169, at 1347–48. 
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business just because there may be risks. 
3. Examples of the DOJ’s Over-Enforcement Against SMEs 
In his order granting Lindsey Manufacturing Company’s motion to 
dismiss on charges of prosecutorial misconduct, Judge A. Howard Matz 
wrote “the very survival of that small, once highly-respected enterprise has 
been placed in jeopardy.”196  The cost to Lindsey of both the investigation 
and subsequent trial was crushing, but this is no isolated incident. Kovacich 
writes about how the DOJ and SEC have honed in on certain industries, like 
medical device manufacturing and agriculture, which are critical to the 
Minnesota and Wisconsin economies.197  He sees this phenomenon 
impacting the “business and legal landscape for small- and medium-sized 
businesses across the country,” not just in those two states.198  For example, 
Twin Cities-based AGA Medical, a company with only 300 employees, was 
accused of making improper payments to doctors at state-owned hospitals 
in China for purchasing AGA products.199  AGA Medical agreed to pay $2 
million in criminal penalties based on the DOJ’s unchallenged theory that 
when a business is state-owned, its employees are foreign officials because 
they are “instrumentalities” of the foreign nation.200 
Consider the SEC’s civil case against Immucor, Inc. (500 employees) 
and its CEO for allegedly paying €13,500 to a director of an Italian hospital 
that turned out to be publicly owned.201  These payments were made to the 
hospital for favoring Immucor on medical supply contracts and the CEO 
ultimately paid a $30,000 penalty without having to admit or deny the 
accusations in the complaint.202  In some circumstances, this is certainly a 
net positive for the company.  In practice, the outside world may perceive 
that the company or individual did in fact do wrong and are just not being 
 
196  Order Granting Motion to Dismiss, United States v. Aguilar Noriega, 831 F. Supp. 
2d 1180, 1209 (C.D. Cal. 2011); see supra notes 111–117. 
197  Kovacich, supra note 29, at 532. 
198  Id.  
199  Id. at 540, n.73 (citing Press Release, AGA Medical Corporation Agrees to Pay $2 
Million Penalty and Enter Deferred Prosecution Agreement for FCPA Violations, Dep’t of 
Just. (June 3, 2008), https://www.justice.gov/archive/opa/pr/2008/June/08-crm-491.html).  
200  Id.  
201  Id. at 546 n.111. 
202  Id.; Litigation Release No. 20316, SEC Files Action Naming Officer of Immucor, 
Inc., for Violating, and Aiding and Abetting Violations of, Books and Records and Internal 
Control Provisions of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (Exchange Act), U.S. SEC. & 
EXCH. COMM’N, (Sept. 28, 2007), https://www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/2007/lr20316.
htm. 
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forced to admit it, even if that is not the case.  In addition, the company or 
individual is then forbidden from ever publicly denying wrongdoing or 
defending against accusations that wrongdoing occurred. 
Finally, consider the story of a Mississippi-based producer and 
marketer of cottonseed, Delta & Pine Land Company.  Over a five-year 
period, Delta & Pine made payments amounting to $43,000 to Turkish 
officials in exchange for “reports and certifications necessary to maintain its 
business operations in Turkey.”203  While the purpose of these payments 
was merely to speed up the government’s inspection and reporting process, 
because the SEC and DOJ have read the facilitating payments exception so 
narrowly (some argue it has been almost completely eliminated from the 
statute), Delta & Pine faced an uphill battle.204  The SEC alleged that 
several of the payments did not coincide with inspections or reports and 
Delta & Pine ultimately agreed to pay a $300,000 penalty.205  These are just 
some examples of the negative and unfair impact the DOJ’s and SEC’s 
enforcement regime has on SMEs operating in the global marketplace. 
IV. PROPOSED SOLUTIONS 
A. EXISTING PROPOSALS 
Several proposals exist for amending the FCPA to account for the 
problems associated with the statute’s implementation, some of which have 
been discussed in the preceding pages of this article.  In thinking about how 
to address these issues, it seems logical to start with existing proposals and 
discuss why they will likely fall short of the goal of reforming the 
enforcement regime in a way that removes the proverbial government boot 
off of the back of the many SMEs that desire to expand into the global 
marketplace. 
Some advocate that the most basic approach to fixing the FCPA is to 
decriminalize unwilling bribery.206  Bruce Klaw argues that the DOJ’s and 
SEC’s prosecution over the last decade has included many individuals 
 
203  Kovacich, supra note 29, at 542. 
204  Id. 
205  Id. (citing Press Release, Delta & Pine and Turk Deltapine Agree to Pay a $300,000 
Penalty to Settle FCPA Charges, SEC (July 26, 2007), https://www.sec.gov/litigation/
litreleases/2007/lr20214.htm (explaining that Delta & Pine agreed to pay a $300,000 
penalty); In the Matter of Delta & Pine Land Co., Exchange Act Release No. 56, 138, 91 
SEC Docket 371 (July 26, 2007), http:// www.sec.gov/litigation/admin/2007/34-56138.pdf). 
206  Bruce W. Klaw, A New Strategy for Preventing Bribery and Extortion in 
International Business Transactions, 49 Harv. J. ON LEGIS. 303, 305 (2012). 
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whose payments were made unwillingly.207  Klaw emphasizes that in 
accordance with United States’ extortion law, an individual who makes an 
“unwilling” payment—a payment that “while made intentionally and 
knowingly, [is] not made voluntarily or corruptly because the payer is 
subject to express or implicit coercive extortion, placing them in reasonable 
fear that if they do not pay, they will be treated unfairly”—should not be 
penalized.208  Numerous federal courts have recognized that an individual or 
a domestic concern can act out of fear because of extortion, including “fear 
of economic loss.”209 
Among his many suggestions, Klaw outlines two possible solutions 
relevant to the treatment of SMEs under the FCPA.  First, Klaw makes the 
case for the decriminalization of unwilling bribery regardless of whether or 
not the extortion “involved threats of threatened jail, property destruction, 
injury, or death” because there is a lack of the requisite mental state.210  
Klaw also argues for the decriminalization of willing bribery under the 
theory that it will promote transparency, that companies should only be 
punished for failing to disclose, and that other companies and foreign 
nations could still sue the discloser under the host country’s laws.211  
Second, Klaw argues that victims of extortion should be permitted to 
disclose the “bribe” and be able to recover non-speculative losses resulting 
from the extortion.212 
Klaw’s first solution should be rejected because companies should be 
held to a high standard when faced with non-violent, non-destructive 
consequences to bribery refusal.  The line drawing between threats of 
extortion that include violence and those that do not is reasonable, and the 
use of economic coercive behavior by a foreign official does not justify 
allowing companies to contravene America’s foreign policy interests.213  
 
207  Id. at 320. 
208  Id. at 320–21. 
209  Id. at 321 (citing United States v. Capo, 817 F.2d 947, 951 (2d Cir. 1987) (en banc) 
(quoting United States v. Brecht, 540 F.2d 45, 52 (2d Cir. 1976))). 
210  Id. at 344–47 (noting that in other non-FCPA contexts, federal courts have found that 
“extortion is committed when a public official makes wrongful use of his office to obtain 
money not due him or his office”). 
211  Id. at 347–49.  
212  Id. at 368–70.  
213  To clarify, I am drawing a distinction between unwilling bribery due to some form of 
extortion (violent or non-violent) that a company is aware of and unwilling bribery in the 
form of clever gamesmanship by foreign officials (i.e., the use of consultants) where the 
company is unaware that the foreign official is seeking a bribe at all. Klaw’s article does not 
address the latter version of unwilling bribery.  
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And willing bribery, where no extortion is involved, should certainly 
remain illegal under the FCPA.  At the time the FCPA was enacted, the 
series of political and business scandals had undermined public confidence 
in the integrity of the market, jeopardized American foreign policy of 
promoting democracy and capitalism, and posed a danger to the free market 
system, where companies should be able to honestly and ethically compete 
in areas like price and quality of product.214  Decriminalizing both willing 
and unwilling bribery in cases of non-violent extortion essentially repeals 
the core of the FCPA, which is an overreaction to the problems facing 
SMEs.  Decriminalizing unwilling bribery based on a company’s lack of 
knowledge, on the other hand, would protect companies, especially 
unsophisticated SMEs, from being victimized on the global stage through 
extortion and then victimized again by the DOJ and SEC in the form of 
hefty penalties and public embarrassment.  This would not solve other 
issues that plague the statute, like vague and overly-expanded terms 
(“foreign official” and “instrumentality”)215 and erosion of the facilitating 
payments exception.216  In addition, it would not protect SMEs and their 
executives who unknowingly engage in bribery but were not coerced.  
However, decriminalizing unwilling bribery would constitute a positive 
reform to the mental state requirements, either by clarifying their reach or 
serving as an affirmative defense. 
Another existing proposal is for Congress to amend the FCPA to 
require the State Department to better define terms used in the enforcement 
of the statute.  Specifically, Matthew Muma argues that if the State 
Department drew on the expertise of Foreign Service officers and defined 
“foreign official” and “instrumentality” for each country, companies would 
be better equipped to navigate situations in specific countries by relying on 
detailed documentation of how the business and political culture in the host 
country operates.217  This would render FCPA enforcement more 
predictable than it is under the underutilized and insufficient opinion release 
 
214  Id. at 307. 
215  See, e.g., Muma, supra note 169, at 1342 (identifying the problems associated with 
vague terms in the FCPA including “foreign official” and “instrumentality” and proposing 
solutions to remedy this issue). See generally Mike Koehler, A Snapshot of the Foreign 
Corrupt Practices Act, 14 SANTA CLARA J. INT’L L. 143 (2016) (discussing recent 
problematic developments in the interpretation of the term “foreign official” under the 
FCPA).  
216  See the discussions regarding, and examples of, the erosion of the facilitating 
payments exceptions at supra note 60, 158–162, 204–205. 
217  Muma, supra note 169, at 1353–54 (creating a rebuttable presumption of FCPA 
compliance that could be challenged in court).  
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regime currently in existence, and the FCPA’s application tailored in 
“specific countries to U.S. foreign policy goals.”218 
This proposal would make a positive difference in the education and 
subsequent operation of companies of all sizes overseas and would take into 
account societies where gift-giving in business transactions is acceptable 
and not considered bribery.219  For example, in the case of AGA Medical, 
the company would have benefited from a State Department analysis and 
report that identified doctors of government-owned hospitals as foreign 
officials under the statute.220  Whether it is the State Department, the courts, 
or Congress, a disinterested party other than the DOJ and SEC should be 
taking greater care to define these critical terms.221 
Unfortunately, this solution does not sufficiently address concerns 
regarding the culpability standard under the law as a whole.  This solution 
alone would not protect the CEO of an SME who inadvertently pays for a 
“government consultant” or “government agent” on an environmental or 
agricultural project, not realizing that the consultant is a clandestine conduit 
for the government to extort bribes.  The DOJ’s and SEC’s 2012 FCPA 
Resource Guide likewise fails to take into account the lack of sophistication 
of SMEs in international business deals and transactions, but rather, only 
considers the lack of sophistication of SMEs with regard to compliance 
programs.222  But because SMEs often lack compliance plans and FCPA-
experienced legal counsel, these sophistication considerations do not benefit 
them. 
Others argue for the creation of a compliance defense because the lack 
of an adequate defense of this nature “reduces a company’s incentive to 
 
218  Id.  
219  Judith A. Lee & James D. Slear, Unique Problems with FCPA Compliance in the 
People’s Republic of China, 16 BUS. L. TODAY 15, 17 (May/June 2007) (“It is well known 
by companies doing business in the [People’s Republic of China (PRC)] that PRC 
businessmen value the opportunity to gain exposure to similar businesses outside of the 
PRC.” And while “PRC rules and regulations require any gift that might affect an official’s 
impartial exercise of his public function be turned over to the state . . . anticorruption laws 
and regulations are reportedly ignored and compliance met with ‘incredulity’ by PRC 
businessmen.”). 
220  See supra notes 198–199.  
221  The DOJ and SEC do not qualify as “disinterested” because while they are 
technically just the neutral enforcers of the FCPA, comments by department officials and the 
revenue from penalties statistics indicate the DOJ and SEC cannot be expected to hamstring 
themselves.   
222  Lanny A. Breuer, et al. (panelists), The Federalist Society for Law and Public Policy 
Studies 2012 National Lawyers Convention the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 51 AM. 
CRIM. L. REV. 433, 458 (2014) (discussing RESOURCE GUIDE, supra note 9).  
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invest in internal anti-bribery policies and to monitor and report any 
identified violations.”223  Under this new defense, a company would still 
need to make a showing of reasonableness with regard to its 
implementation and maintenance of an anti-bribery program and “[m]eeting 
these conditions would only afford a rebuttable presumption that the 
company as an entity is not liable for the FCPA violations of its rogue 
employees.”224 
Of course, when considering SMEs, the alleged rogue employee could 
easily be a high-ranking executive because they are more closely held 
companies.  Additionally, this solution is not adequate for SMEs because 
they often cannot afford to develop a robust compliance program of the sort 
that would be required to take advantage of this rebuttable compliance 
defense.  Thus, even if a compliance program defense existed, it would be 
insufficient to protect SMEs from unbridled enforcement.225 
Some have suggested that amending the statute to compensate victims 
of corruption and bribery would alter how the DOJ and SEC prosecute 
companies under the FCPA.226  Currently, the DOJ uses the FCPA 
enforcement regime as a profit generator and makes little to no attempt to 
compensate victims of American corruption and bribery abroad, despite 
 
223  Irina Sivachenko, Corporate Victims of “Victimless Crime”: How the FCPA’s 
Statutory Ambiguity, Coupled with Strict Liability, Hurts Businesses and Discourages 
Compliance, 54 B.C. L. REV. 393, 425 (2013). 
224  Id.  
225  The Conference Report for the 1988 FCPA Amendments indicates that a provision 
granting safe harbor to corporations with FCPA compliance program from prosecution was 
included but ultimately removed from the final bill.  H.R. REP. NO. 100-576, at 922–23 
(1988), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1955; see also Bhojwani, supra note 87, at 74 n.57 
(referencing Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Assessment: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on 
Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland Sec. of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 112th Cong. 38 
(2011) (statement of George Terwilliger, Partner, White & Case, LLP) (advocating for 
adoption of FCPA safe-harbor provision that “shield[s] from criminal liability companies 
that operate demonstrably robust compliance programs and that self-report any misconduct 
that arises”)). 
226  See, e.g., Gideon Mark, Private FCPA Enforcement, 49 AM. BUS. L.J. 419 (2012) 
(advocating for a private right of action under the FCPA for a variety of reasons including 
compensating victims of FCPA violations); see also Shane Frick, “ICE” Capades: 
Restitution Orders and the FCPA, 12 RICH. J. GLOBAL L. & BUS. 433, 448–50 (2013) 
(discussing how DOJ would have to begin thinking of FCPA violations in terms of harm 
done to victims (economic, cultural, etc.) which would (A) potentially limit the amount of 
penalties/damages the government could seek from companies and (B) prosecutorial action 
taken against companies would be based on a need to make specific victims whole and not 
on the current reality that all penalties/damages go back to the U.S. government).  
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repeatedly claiming that bribery is not a victimless crime.227  Victims have 
sought relief in U.S. courts for restitution in the wake of FCPA violations.  
For example, the Instituto Constarricense de Electricidad of Costa Rica 
(ICE) “petitioned for victim status of Alcatel-Lucent’s wide-ranging bribery 
scheme” in 2011 due to alleged massive losses and catastrophic harm 
resulting from the bribery.228  ICE claimed the harm done was to other 
employees and the company based on the actions of five employees out of 
16,500 total employees.229  The DOJ argued against giving ICE victim 
status and restitution because ICE employees were also involved in the 
bribery.230 
While ICE’s petition ultimately failed,231 there is room for more 
sympathetic bribery victims to apply pressure to the DOJ enforcement 
regime by seeking restitution.  If a future case brought by an entity like ICE 
or an individual is successful, this could open the door to amending the 
FCPA to specifically require the government to seek to disperse a portion of 
the fines and disgorgement levied against offending U.S. companies to 
victims of corruption abroad, which would hopefully cause the DOJ to 
more carefully consider when to prosecute, thereby benefiting SMEs and 
companies in general. 
Matthew Kovacich argues specifically for Congress to “update the 
FCPA to provide a more usable opinion procedure and legality defense.”232  
Kovacich argues that while Congress intended to protect a company if it 
 
227  See, e.g., Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Just., California Company, Its Two Executives 
and Intermediary Convicted by Federal Jury in Los Angeles on All Counts for Their 
Involvement in Scheme to Bribe Officials at State-Owned Electrical Utility in Mexico (May 
10, 2011), http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2011/May/11-crm-596.html (“Bribery is not a 
victimless crime . . . .”); see Alexandra Wrage, Paying the Fox to Buy New Chickens, 
HUFFINGTON POST (Jul. 15, 2011), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/alexandra-wrage/paying-
the-fox-to-buy-new_b_647837.html. Contra Andy Spalding, “A DOJ Initiative that Helps 
Corruption’s Victims” FCPA BLOG (Oct. 15, 2014), http://www.fcpablog.com/blog/2014/10/
15/a-doj-initiative-that-helps-corruptions-victims.html; see also Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of 
Just., Second Vice President of Equatorial Guinea Agrees to Relinquish More Than $30 
Million of Assets Purchased with Corruption Proceeds (Oct. 10, 2014), https://www.justice.
gov/opa/pr/second-vice-president-equatorial-guinea-agrees-relinquish-more-30-million-
assets-purchased (providing money for the direct benefit of people harmed by the Equatorial 
Guinea Vice President’s abuse of office through large-scale foreign official corruption).  
228  Mike Koehler, The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Under the Microscope, 15 U. PA. 
J. BUS. L. 1, 51 (2012) (citing United States v. Alcatel-Lucent S.A., No. 1:10-cr-20907-MGC 
(S.D. Fla. dismissed May 31, 2011)).  
229  Id. at 51–52. 
230  Id. at 52. 
231  Id.  
232  Kovacich, supra note 29, at 563. 
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abides by the local law or custom in a foreign nation, this protection is weak 
because the statute requires the local law or custom to be expressly written 
down in the foreign nation’s law.233  Congress failed to realize that not all 
social norms are encapsulated in law, even if they have substantial force.234  
Kovacich calls for Congress to amend the statute to provide for an opinion 
release procedure where companies could address matters of custom and 
business norms with the DOJ and SEC in advance of taking action, 
especially when the custom or norm is not written in the foreign country’s 
laws.235  This solution would certainly make a significant difference for 
many companies of all sizes.  But, once again, the unsophisticated SMEs 
are not protected from many unwilling “bribes” under this solution, and it is 
not geared towards solving the larger problem of the DOJ and SEC 
enforcement regime unchecked by case law. 
B. NEW SOLUTIONS 
This section builds off of some of the existing solutions proposed to 
solve the FCPA’s many problems while also offering several additional 
alternative solutions that would benefit SMEs in particular and protect them 
from the current, unfair enforcement regime.  Specifically, this section 
argues for legislative clarification regarding the mental state requirements 
for domestic concerns and for statutory provisions requiring more judicial 
oversight of the DOJ and SEC prosecution regime under the FCPA with 
regard to DPAs, NPAs, and settlements. 
In a perfect world, change would happen organically by companies 
that are able to afford the risk of challenging the DOJ and SEC in court.  In 
particular, companies should further litigate the FCPA’s mental states to 
better define these terms, the narrowing of statutory exceptions, and the 
overall spirit of the statute regarding how damages are assessed.236  
Unfortunately, expecting companies to take the extremely high-risk path of 
a jury trial is not very realistic, especially in light of the enforcement regime 
the DOJ and SEC have developed over time, which forces companies to 
settle in the face of such extreme penalties.  Although the government’s 
record is zero for two in federal court against corporations,237 most 
companies remain unconvinced that the monetary risks are worth the 
litigation fight that would await them in court. 
 
233  Id. at 562–63. 
234  Id.  
235  Id.  
236  See supra Part III. 
237  See the text accompanying supra notes 106–119.  
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The most important and necessary legislative change required is for 
Congress to amend the statute to alter the mental state requirement to 
account for businesses early on in their international economic participation 
and development.  This can be accomplished in several ways.  Perhaps the 
simplest way is to create a specific intent element applicable for the anti-
bribery provision to make the FCPA akin to the tax statutes.  In Ratzlaf v. 
United States,238 the Supreme Court reviewed the defendant’s conviction 
for illegally structuring a transaction, by “break[ing] up a single transaction 
above the reporting threshold into two or more separate transactions[] for 
the purpose of evading a financial institution’s reporting requirement.”239  
The Court held that the statute’s “willfulness” element required something 
more than just a “purpose to circumvent a bank’s reporting obligation” and 
that ignorance of the anti-structuring law was indeed an excuse.240  The 
Court held that provisions of the Currency and Foreign Transactions 
Reporting Act (Bank Secrecy Act)241 and other tax statutes are so difficult 
to understand that to say a lack of knowledge of the statute and its 
provisions was no excuse would be to read the willful element out of the 
statute or at least render it superfluous.242  If a lack of knowledge of the tax 
statute was not a defense, there was a risk of innocent conduct being 
punished.243 
Since there is little chance a case under the FCPA’s anti-bribery 
provisions will reach the Supreme Court in the near future due to the 
settlement trends, Congress should act to amend the statute to more clearly 
function like the tax statutes.  This would allow SMEs some measure of 
protection because, in the event they cannot afford an expensive compliance 
program or are completely ignorant of the FCPA due to a lack of 
sophistication and previous international business experience, they have a 
viable defense under the intent element.  Then, the government would have 
to show that the company was aware of the FCPA and its prohibitions and 
that the company willfully violated the statute.  It should be noted that in 
order to succeed in this endeavor, the “willfully” element must be made to 
 
238  510 U.S. 135 (1994). 
239  Id. at 136 (citing 31 U.S.C. § 5324 (1988)). 
240  Id. at 136–37, 149. 
241  Pub. L. No. 91–508, 84 Stat. 1118 (1970) (codified at 31 U.S.C. §§ 5311–5325).  
242  Ratzlaf, 510 U.S. at 136.  
243  Lipper, supra note 40, at 1476 (pointing out that cases like Ratzlaf presented “the 
risk of catching individuals who engaged in innocent conduct” and that courts have said such 
a risk does not exist in the FCPA context). 
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apply to SMEs under the domestic concern section244 because currently it 
only applies to individuals.245  This would be especially helpful for small, 
closely held businesses where the lines between the corporation’s actions 
and individuals’ actions can be blurred because high-level executives make 
a wide range of decisions as to a company’s beginning forays into the 
global marketplace. 
Alternatively, Congress should put in place new boundaries on the use 
of settlements by the DOJ and SEC when prosecuting companies.  The DOJ 
and SEC should be required by statute to abide by the following new 
settlement boundary steps: (1) all investigations lasting more than 365 days 
must be filed in an Article III court as preliminary indictments; (2) these 
preliminary indictments will be reviewed every 90 days for merit, and the 
Article III court will have the authority to dismiss the indictments and by 
extension, the investigations when they are not yielding fruit or for a failure 
to prosecute; and (3) settlements that exceed the statutorily prescribed fine 
amounts or cross certain statutorily provided benchmarks must be approved 
by the Article III court or meet certain thresholds for reasonableness.  These 
measures will provide substantial protections to companies of all sizes, but 
particularly SMEs that struggle to pay for the investigation, litigation, and 
any settlement that comes with a DOJ or SEC decision to prosecute. 
The first element is designed to force the DOJ and SEC into the court 
system where more judicial oversight will occur, even over settlements.  
This will also prevent government agents from dragging out investigations 
that force companies into DPAs and NPAs where the government then has 
substantial control to place extreme remedy demands on the company in 
exchange for the company avoiding trial and a public relations nightmare.246  
The second element is designed to reinforce the need for the DOJ and SEC 
to only pursue investigations and prosecutions for as long as they are 
grounded in fact and reasonably likely to be successful. In addition, the 
second element requires that a neutral party be present and able to step in 
and save a company (particularly an SME) from being bled of resources in 
its defense against unmeritorious prosecutions outside the scope of the 
FCPA.  The final element provides for a neutral arbiter to assess the 
reasonableness of the penalty in light of the actions the defendant is 
 
244  15 U.S.C.A. § 78dd-2(g)(2)(A) (West 1998) (for domestic concerns).  
245  Lipper, supra note 40, at 1474–75 (discussing how at least one court’s imprecision in 
attributing the willfulness element leads to an improper inference that the willfulness 
element applies to both individual and domestic concerns under the FCPA when it does not).  
246  See supra Part III.A and III.B.1 for a discussion of DPAs and NPAs and the 
governments use of them.  
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pleading guilty to or admitting occurred.  The statute could be amended to 
take into account and sanction the disgorgement policies of the DOJ and 
SEC and then require any settlement over $6 million or (treble the 
statutorily proscribed penalty for a violation) a certain percentage of the 
company’s value (market capitalization) be approved by an Article III 
judge.247  These elements will directly remedy situations like the one Team 
Inc. faced where the investigation costs and potential fines far outweighed 
the alleged prohibited conduct.248  Of course, a company that determined 
this filing timeline was not in its best interest could stipulate with the 
government to an extension of these deadlines (but not waive them 
entirely). 
One possible criticism of the settlement boundary steps solution is that 
courts will apply Chevron deference to decades of department and agency 
“jurisprudence,” thereby neutralizing the desired benefits of these 
changes.249  Specifically, courts first look to “whether Congress has directly 
spoken to the precise question at issue” and if the answer is yes, Congress’s 
intent controls.250  But where the statute is silent or ambiguous on a 
particular issue, “the question for the court is whether the agency’s answer 
is based on a permissible construction of the statute.”251  One could argue 
that these settlement boundary provisions will not be enough to encourage 
courts to discuss the specific provisions and terms of the statute.  Enforcing 
step number two, for example, requires courts to evaluate the merit of the 
preliminary indictment and related investigation.  But if the courts punt in 
favor of DOJ enforcement precedent regarding how various statutory 
provisions, exceptions, and affirmative defenses work and what various 
terms mean, then the merits review may not have the teeth needed to pare 
back the DOJ and SEC enforcement regime.  This is why Congress must 
simultaneously enact amendments to the mental state requirement, 
 
247  There are other means of controlling the prosecution regime of the DOJ and SEC and 
preventing SMEs from accruing crippling legal costs on top of excessive fines, 
disgorgement, and settlement amounts. For example, Congress could provide that SME 
attorney’s fees count toward the percentage threshold that requires judicial review of the 
settlement. 
248  See supra note 187.  
249  Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 844 (1984) 
(“We have long recognized that considerable weight should be accorded to an executive 
department’s construction of a statutory scheme it is entrusted to administer, and the 
principle of deference to administrative interpretations . . . .”).  
250  Id. at 842–43 (holding that “the agency[] must give effect to the unambiguously 
expressed intent of Congress”).  
251  Id. at 843. 
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incorporate the suggested changes in Part IV.A regarding the definitions of 
“foreign officials” and “instrumentalities,” and provide some clarity on the 
exceptions that exist in the statute for facilitating payments and abiding by 
local law or custom.252  In conjunction with the settlement boundary steps, 
these changes will make a meaningful difference for SMEs just entering, or 
relatively new to, the global marketplace. 
CONCLUSION 
Congress enacted the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act to put a stop to 
massive international bribery by large, sophisticated U.S. corporations, but 
not to penalize unsophisticated small- and medium--size enterprises new to 
the international marketplace.  In an era of unbridled, unsupervised DOJ 
and SEC prosecution, the FCPA is not being enforced as originally 
intended.  Statutory exceptions have been effectively eliminated, the lack of 
case law has muddied the waters with regard to mental state requirements, 
and in an ironic twist, the very governmental bodies charged with rooting 
out corruption abroad are now engaged in a sort of legal extortion through a 
regime that over-enforces and over-penalizes companies regardless of their 
actual culpability and ability to afford the necessary programs and controls 
needed to stay abreast of and in compliance with the FCPA.  The DOJ and 
SEC cannot be trusted to make the necessary fixes on their own because 
they have too much skin in the game—FCPA enforcement actions are 
viewed as a cash cow and the authorities have given every indication that 
the current prosecution and enforcement regime will only continue if not 
expand. 
Some of the existing solutions proposed by academics and 
practitioners alike would certainly make a positive impact on the current 
situation.  But most, if not all, fall short of addressing problems unique to 
SMEs under the FCPA.  Muma makes a compelling case for the creation of 
country-specific guides by the State Department to address concerns over 
the definition of terms in the FCPA and also to distinguish differences in 
culture and local custom for the purposes of applying and giving teeth to the 
facilitating payments and local law or custom exceptions.  But most of the 
existing solutions are not tailored to assisting SMEs that are new to or 
inexperienced in the global marketplace, cannot afford the expensive, big 
law compliance plans large companies pay for, and are too often wholly 
unaware of the FCPA and the forms corruption takes abroad. 
 
252  15 U.S.C. § 78dd-2(a) (2012); 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-2(h)(2)(A) (2012) (defining 
“foreign official”). 
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As a result, Congress needs to amend the FCPA in several ways.  First, 
Congress should add language to render the FCPA a specific intent statute 
for the purposes of corporations rather than a general intent statute.  And 
Congress should require a showing of “willfulness” for domestic concerns 
as well as individuals so that closely held companies that are tricked into 
committing bribery have a defense.  Second, Congress should put in place 
new boundaries on the use of settlements by the DOJ and SEC when 
prosecuting companies.  The three additional requirements proposed in Part 
IV.B will reign in meritless and unjust investigations and subsequent 
prosecutions while also putting in place protection for SMEs that cannot 
afford the high costs associated with said investigations and defending 
against litigation and penalties.  Finally, these additional steps will create 
more judicial oversight of the current FCPA enforcement regime.  The 
purpose of this oversight, in addition to the reasons previously mentioned 
above, is to create more opportunities for genuine statutory interpretation by 
a disinterested third party to occur on FCPA terms and provisions of serious 
importance.  These include but are not limited to terms like “foreign 
official” and “instrumentality,” as well as the various exceptions and 
affirmative defenses that have been essentially eliminated through a severe 
narrowing by the DOJ and SEC. 
These changes, combined with some of the strong existing proposals, 
could make for a better FCPA statute.  With these changes, the FCPA will 
better prevent foreign corruption by domestic companies and individuals for 
the protection of the nation’s foreign policy goals and the promotion of a 
fair capitalist system while also ensuring companies lacking culpability are 
not swept in the broad net currently cast by the DOJ and the SEC. 
